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transportation. The goal of the Journal is to be recognized as the preeminent 
scholarly journal in the aeronautical aspects of transportation. As an 
international and interdisciplinary journal, the JAT will provide a forum for 
peer-reviewed articles in all areas of aviation and space transportation 
research, policy, theory, case study, practice, and issues. While maintaining 
a broad scope, a focal point of the journal will be in the area of aviation 
administration and policy.
Development:
The JAT was conceptualized to fulfill an international void of scholarly 
publications in this area as identified by the primary organizers. It is 
envisioned that aviation leaders will utilize the JAT as a key decision-
making tool. Scholarly rigor and standards will be uncompromised with 
regular evaluation by the Editorial Board and Panel of Reviewers.
Scope:
The JAT accepts manuscripts on all topics that relate to air transportation, 
both technical and non-technical. The Panel of Reviewers represents the 
interdisciplinary nature of air transportation to ensure review by recognized 
experts. Broad categories of appropriate topics include, but are not limited 
to:
Aviation Administration: Management, Economics, Policy, 
Fixed Based Operations, Employment & Internships, 
Marketing; 
Airport Planning, Design & Development: Capacity & 
Delay, Small Aircraft Transportation Systems (SATS), Air 
Transportation Systems—Domestic & International; 
Aviation Law: Air Traffic Control, Regulation Process, 
Privatization; 
Airlines & Cargo: Logistics, Transport Operations, Air Carrier 
Training, Low Cost Airlines, Intermodal Transportation; 
Education & Training: Aviation Education, Cognitive Factors 
& Learning Styles, Instructional Techniques, Distance 
Learning, Aviation/Aerospace Psychology & Safety, Human 
Factors & Crew Resource Management; 
Technology: Engineering, Aerospace Structures, Propulsion & 
Performance, Avionics, Geographic Information Systems, 
Simulation, Electronic Signal Processing, Electronic Markets & 
Internet, Meteorology & Weather Services; 
Future Advancements: Space Transportation & Flight, 
General Aviation, Forecasting
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available through inter-library loan at the University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Library and the Transport and Telecommunications Institute in Latvia via 
accessing the global OCLC inter-library loan network. A permanent archive 
is maintained at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Annual subscriptions 
are available on CD-ROM for $35 for individuals and $99 for institutions. 
Hard copies may be available pending special request.  Add $20 for 
subscriptions outside the U.S.A.  Payments may be made by check or 
purchase order to the UNO Aviation Institute.
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of the board. This appointment should be viewed as professional 
recognition of significant career achievement and high 
academic/industry distinction. Applicants will generally be senior 
faculty members (graduate faculty standing where applicable), or 
persons who have attained substantial industry or public service 
achievement in the case of practitioner members. Term of 
appointment is three years with opportunity to request renewal. For 
membership consideration, submit a curriculum vita or industry 
resume and statement of interest to: Dr. Brent Bowen, Executive 
Editor.
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Brent D. Bowen
Dr. Brent Bowen is Director and Distinguished Professor, Aviation 
Institute, School of Public Administration, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, and the University’s Director of Aviation and Transportation Policy 
and Research. Bowen attained his doctorate in Higher Education and 
Aviation from Oklahoma State University and a Master of Business 
Administration degree from Oklahoma City University. His Federal 
Aviation Administration certifications include Airline Transport Pilot, 
Certified Flight Instructor (Gold Seal), Advanced Instrument Ground 
Instructor, Aviation Safety Counselor, and Aerospace Education Counselor. 
Dr. Bowen’s research on the development of the national Airline Quality 
Rating is regularly featured in numerous national and international media, 
as well as refereed academic publications. Dr. Bowen has in excess of 300 
publications, papers, and program appearances to his credit. His research 
interests focus on aviation applications of public productivity enhancement 
and marketing in the areas of service quality evaluation, forecasting, and 
student recruitment/retention in collegiate aviation programs. He is also 
well published in areas related to effective teaching and has pioneered new 
pedagogical techniques. Dr. Bowen has been recognized with awards of 
achievement and commendation from the American Marketing Association, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, W. Frank Barton 
School of Business, Travel and Transportation Research Association, World 
Aerospace Education Association, and others.
Igor Kabashkin
Dr. Igor Kabashkin is Vice Rector of the Transport and 
Telecommunications Institute, Latvia, and a Professor in the Aviation 
Maintenance Department and member of the Technical Committee on 
Transport of the European Commission for Cooperation in the Field of 
Scientific and Technical Research. Kabashkin received his Doctor Degree 
in Aviation from Moscow Civil Engineering Institute, a High Doctor 
Degree in Aviation from Moscow Aviation Institute, and a Doctor Habilitus 
Degree in Engineering from Riga Aviation University and Latvian 
Academy of Science. His research interests include analysis and modeling 
of complex technical systems, information technology applications, 
reliability of technical systems, radio and telecommunication systems, and 
information and quality control systems. Dr. Kabashkin has published over 
274 scientific papers, 19 scientific and teaching books, and holds 67 patents 
and certificates of invention.
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ABSTRACT 
The importance of aeronautical decision making (ADM) has been considered one of 
the most critical issues of flight education for future professional pilots. Researchers 
have suggested that a safety information system based on information from incidents 
and near misses is an important tool to improve the intelligence and readiness of 
pilots. This paper describes a study that examines the effect of safety information on 
aeronautical decision making for students in a collegiate flight program. Data was 
collected from study participants who were exposed to periodic information about 
local aircraft malfunctions. Participants were then evaluated using a flight simulator 
profile and a pen and pencil test of situational judgment. Findings suggest that 
regular access to the described safety information program significantly improves 
decision making of student pilots. 
 
Dr. Jang R. Lee received a Master of Science in Aviation Safety from Central Missouri State 
University and a Ph.D. in Technology from Purdue University. He is currently assigned to 
Headquarters, Republic of Korea Air Force, Taejon, Korea. 
Dr. Richard. O. Fanjoy received a Master of Arts in Industrial Management from Central 
Michigan University and a Ph.D. in Higher Education from Purdue University. He is an 
Assistant Professor, Department of Aviation Technology, Purdue University, with extensive 
flight experience in worldwide operations of heavy jet aircraft. 
Brian G. Dillman received a Master of Arts in Curriculum and Instruction from Purdue 
University. He is an Assistant Professor and the Assistant Director of Flight Training, 
Department of Aviation Technology, Purdue University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sound pilot decision making is essential to the safe completion of 
every flight. O’Hare (2003) indicates that “It is difficult to think of any 
single topic that is more central to the question of effective human 
performance in aviation than that of decision making” (p. 230). The term 
aeronautical decision making (ADM) has been used to describe and assess 
pilot judgment within many aviation circles (Jensen, 1997) Paradoxically, 
aeronautical decision making, so crucial to the safety of flight, often receives 
scant emphasis in pilot training. Richard Jensen, the General Chair of the 
Ninth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, commented, 
“Unfortunately, most student pilots do not receive structured decision 
making or judgment training either in their initial or later flying 
experience…[and]…How can we expect them to reach above the level of 
competence if we do not teach judgment?” (Jensen, 1997, p. iv). Jensen 
suggests that training in aeronautical decision making/judgment can take the 
form of reading case studies about accidents and incidents as well as 
studying the experiences of other pilots in abnormal situations.  
Eiff (1999) suggests that the state of intelligent and respectful 
wariness can foster a heightened state of vigilance for error potentials and 
dedication to performing safe acts. In addition, Reason (1997) notes that: 
  
In the absence of bad outcomes, the best way—perhaps the only way—
to sustain a state of intelligent and respectful wariness is to gather the 
right kinds of data. This means creating a safety information system 
that collects, analyzes and disseminates information from incidents and 
near misses as well as from regular proactive checks on the system’s 
vital signs. (p. 195)  
 
Many safety information systems in aviation have been developed 
around the world, including the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) 
used in the United Kingdom, and the British Airways Safety Information 
System (BASIS). Three years ago, Purdue University researchers created a 
safety information system entitled the Aircraft Discrepancy Analysis Metrics 
(ADAM). Dillman, Lee, and Petrin (2003) have reported on detailed features 
of ADAM and its utilization. ADAM was originally designed to gather, 
track, and analyze aircraft discrepancies as a tool for aircraft safety 
management. It has been used to compile five years of information on 
mechanical discrepancies for all Purdue aircraft. The description of every 
aircraft discrepancy written in each logbook has been analyzed and 
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categorized into a unified metric format. However, most Purdue aviation 
students are unaware of ADAM because its main application has been at the 
resource management level.  
The content and structure of initial flight education, as in other fields of 
education, are extremely important. Jensen (1997) feels that “initial training 
can have an effect on certain aspects of flying that may carry throughout 
one’s career” (p. v). Clearly, initial training in a collegiate flight program is 
one of the most defining stages for future professional pilots. It is imperative 
that students acquire sound decision making strategies from the very 
beginning as this skill forms the basis for an approach to safety decisions 
throughout their entire professional career. Since most flight education 
employs little structured judgment training, a safety information system 
would appear to be a valuable instrument for enhancing desired student 
aeronautical decision making.  
The purpose of this study was to assess whether a safety information 
system could effectively improve aeronautical decision making for students 
in a collegiate flight program. Three theories support the potential benefits of 
safety information to flight students’ decision making: the Detailed 
Judgment Model (Jensen, Adrion, Maresh, & Weinert, 1987), Naturalistic 
Decision Making Theory (Lipshitz, 1993; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; 
Thargard, 1988), and the Learning Framework (Gredler, 2001).  
Jensen, Adrion, Maresh, and Weinert (1987) use their Detailed 
Judgment Model to explain that aeronautical decisions are made with 
rational and motivational judgments. A safety information system is thought 
to be beneficial for rational judgment. While motivational judgment deals 
with personal motivation to execute a suitable course of action, rational 
judgment follows five sequentially connected steps: problem vigilance, 
problem recognition, problem diagnosis, alternative identification, and risk 
analysis. For these steps of rational judgment, a good source of information 
will help pilot vigilance. Pilots generally use the simplest or most 
economical interpretation of a stimulus to arrive at the interpretation most 
likely to match the source of stimulation during problem recognition. 
Problem diagnosis requires an understanding of prior probabilities for certain 
events, and comes into significant play when there may be a mechanical 
problem with the aircraft. The stage of rational judgment where alternatives 
are identified requires creativity and knowledge of the aircraft. Risk analysis 
requires computational approximation skills and knowledge of the relative 
safety in different courses of action (Jensen, 1995).  
Naturalistic Decision Making Theory advocates support the beneficial 
effect of a safety information system. Lipshitz (1993) says that experts in 
naturalistic decision making tend to generate a single course of action as the 
best choice. Based on the classification of the problem, decision makers 
provide a single highly likely option and evaluate its appropriateness to the 
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current conditions. Orasanu and Connolly (1993) also say that decision 
makers use their knowledge to organize the problem, to interpret the 
situation, and to define what information is needed to arrive at a solution. 
This process allows the decision maker to make a speedy assessment, search, 
selection, and interpretation of relevant information.  
Finally, the Learning Framework reported by Gredler (2001) depicts the 
potentially beneficial effect of a safety information system to flight students. 
The learning framework consists of the learner’s prior knowledge and 
organization of the information (encoding) to be learned. The learner’s prior 
knowledge serves to identify incoming information and also influences the 
inferences made by the learner about new information. Encoding is the 
process that prepares selected information for storage in long-term memory 
and later recall. Encoding requires the construction of meaningful links 
between the new concepts or ideas and the learner’s prior knowledge. The 
higher cognitive functions are characterized by conscious awareness of the 
encoding process and permit the individual to make use of logical 
relationships and generalizations (Gredler, 2001). 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study considered the hypothesis that a safety information system 
such as ADAM would have a beneficial effect on student pilots’ aeronautical 
decision making in critical flight safety situations. The following research 
questions were developed to direct the study.   
1. Is the recognition time for abnormal aircraft conditions shorter 
for flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM than for 
non-exposed students? 
2. Is the response time for abnormal aircraft conditions shorter for 
flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM than for non-
exposed students? 
3. Do the flight students who periodically review ADAM follow 
more appropriate procedures to resolve an abnormal aircraft 
condition than those who do not? 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Volunteers were recruited from a population of students who were in 
their second to fourth semesters of a baccalaureate degree program, had 
received their private pilot certificate, and were training for a commercial 
pilot certificate. Study participants were randomly selected from the 
volunteer pool and randomly assigned to equally sized experiment and 
control groups. Based on a statistical power analysis, forty volunteers were 
initially assigned to the study. However, six individuals later discontinued 
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their participation and were dropped from the study. As a result, study 
findings are based on data collected from 34 participants (17 in each group).   
 
Research Design 
 The study treatment consisted of measured access to current ADAM 
information. This access was through the university’s online teaching 
structure using WebCT Vista. Each flight student in the experimental group 
was provided WebCT access to the ADAM database throughout the duration 
of the study. These students were directed to review ADAM prior to each 
flight and specifically focus on the discrepancy history of the aircraft that 
they would be flying. Furthermore, periodic reminders and announcements 
were posted online that directed students to be wary and focus on particular 
systems failures. This treatment was provided to the experiment group eight 
times over a five-week period and included information on aircraft system 
malfunctions. In addition, the control and experiment groups both completed 
a pre- and post-treatment pencil and paper test of decision making skills and 
a short simulator profile flight. The ADAM treatment was the independent 
variable for this study and the dependent variable was flight student 
judgment during critical flight safety situations, measured in terms of 
recognition time, response time, and appropriate actions. The ADAM 
treatment was postulated to positively influence flight student decision 
making.  
 
Instrumentation 
To answer the research questions in this study, two types of instruments 
were used, the Situational Judgment Test (SJT) and a Frasca 141 profile 
flight. The SJT is a paper and pencil type instrument developed by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assess general aviation pilots’ 
decision making skills. Hunter (2003) advises, “the SJT has potential for use 
in the assessment of judgment or aeronautical decision making by general 
aviation (GA) pilots, and might be useful in the evaluation of training” (p. 
373). The SJT is used to evaluate differences between solutions 
recommended by an FAA-designated panel of subject matter experts and 
judgment/decisions made by general aviation pilots (Hunter, 2003).  
A Frasca 141 flight-training device (FTD) was used to measure study 
participants’ decision processes during abnormal flight conditions. A 
detailed FTD test plan was developed under the supervision and guidance of 
a local panel of flight experts. This five-member panel was composed of 
FAA-designated flight examiners, flight instructors, and professional 
aviation maintenance technicians. The panel’s advice concerning the 
technical and mechanical issues of aircraft and simulator operation were 
pivotal in the planning of the test events. Activity in the FTD included a 
preflight briefing and a flight profile with periodic malfunction trigger 
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events. Participant activity in response to the malfunctions was recorded on 
an assessment form.  
Three variables were measured during the FTD flight: recognition time, 
response time, and appropriateness of response to the trigger events. 
Recognition time was measured from the introduction of a simulated aircraft 
system malfunction (trigger event) until the participant recognized the 
situation. The indications of recognition were either the participant’s verbal 
expression or physical action of recognition, such as pointing out the 
appropriate aircraft performance indicator or initiation of corrective action 
(e.g., turning off an alternator switch for alternator failure). Maximum 
waiting time until a participant recognized the event was planned as 300 
seconds (five minutes). If a participant did not recognize the event within the 
time line, the participant’s recognition time was recorded as 300 seconds.  
Response time was measured from recognition of a simulated abnormal 
aircraft condition (trigger event) until the participant completed the 
corrective actions. If a participant did not initiate any corrective action until 
after 300 seconds (five minutes), the response time was reported as 300 
seconds.  
Appropriateness of response to an abnormal aircraft condition was 
measured by analyzing the participant’s sequence of corrective actions. 
These corrective actions were compared with recommended procedures in 
the Piper Warrior III pilot’s operating handbook and the FAA-approved 
airplane flight manual (Piper Warrior, 1995). In measuring corrective 
actions, two considerations were applied: did the corrective actions include 
all steps from the recommended procedure, and were the corrective actions 
completed in the recommended sequence. These measurements were 
recorded with numeric scores on an assessment form. 
 Trigger events for the FTD profile were selected after consideration of 
guidelines provided by the flight expert panel. Only trigger events that could 
be initiated from the simulator instructor’s control console were used. Profile 
standardization could only be assured if the timing for a trigger event, the 
control of the trigger event, aircraft position in the profile, and flight altitude 
were controlled in a consistent manner from the control console. In addition, 
trigger events should produce an immediate instrument or warning light 
indication when initiated. Recognition time for each trigger event was based 
on a video record that captured the elapsed time from when a trigger event 
was initiated until the participant recognized the event, as evidenced by an 
auditory cue or observable action. Therefore, immediate instrument or 
warning light indication was essential in order to have a starting point for 
measuring those times. Finally, each trigger event should have only one 
appropriate corrective action as specified by the Piper Warrior III pilot’s 
operating handbook and the FAA-approved airplane flight manual (1995). 
Corrective actions to each trigger event were measured by counting 
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deviations from the recommended corrective action, missed steps in the 
procedure, and actions not completed in the recommended sequence by a 
participant. Using these guidelines, four trigger events were eventually 
selected for use during the FTD profile: alternator failure, high oil pressure, 
high load meter, and vacuum pump system failure.  
A flight profile was developed to set uniform flight parameters for each 
participant. The flight profile was divided into four legs and each leg 
included one trigger event. During the flight profile, participants were asked 
to make periodic heading or altitude changes to make the flying condition 
more realistic and reduce the anticipation of trigger events. To minimize 
possible threats to internal validity caused by participant interaction with the 
FTD, the flight profile was only completed posttest (after the treatment). The 
SJT was completed pre- and posttest. Measurements for each test are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Study measurements 
 
Since the Frasca 141 FTD cockpit display has no circuit breakers, unlike 
a real aircraft, a simulated circuit breaker panel was made and affixed to the 
instrument panel of the simulator to facilitate completion of required 
corrective actions. In addition, the front monitor screen of the simulator was 
set to represent Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) for participant 
reference. All flight performance was videotaped to capture data for later 
analysis. Data acquired with the SJT and Frasca 141 FTD was reviewed and 
analyzed using the SAS System for Windows (SAS Institute, 2004). 
RESULTS 
The SJT instrument is structured in a multiple-choice format with four 
alternative choices to each question. The answer choices for each SJT 
question were ranked from most correct to least correct by FAA-designated 
subject matter experts. Participants who took the SJT were asked to select 
Pretest Posttest Instrument 
Experiment 
Group 
Control  
Group 
Experiment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Measurement 
Frasca 141 
FTD 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Recognition  
Time 
Frasca 141 
FTD 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Response 
Time 
Frasca 141 
FTD 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Appropriateness 
of Response 
SJT Yes Yes Yes Yes Adherence to 
Recommended 
Solution 
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their best choice among the four possible answers to each question. 
Adherence of participant’s decision to the recommended solution was 
measured by comparing how close the participant’s choice was to the most 
correct answer recommended by the expert panel. An Analysis of 
Covariance (ANCOVA) analysis with the posttest SJT as the response 
variable and the pretest SJT as the covariate was applied to the data. The 
results of this test indicated a statistically significant difference between the 
control group and the experimental group for posttest SJT scores (F = 36.40, 
p < 0.0001), which suggests the positive effect of an ADAM treatment.  
The difference between posttest and pretest SJT scores within the 
experimental group was analyzed with a regression model. This analysis 
examined the level of procedural accuracy before and after treatment. The 
regression analysis indicated that the posttest SJT result of the experimental 
group was significantly different from their pretest SJT result (t = 4.71, p = 
0.0003). Again, this suggests the positive effect of an ADAM treatment. 
Appropriateness of response to an abnormal aircraft condition was 
measured by analyzing the participant’s corrective action to resolve the 
abnormal condition during the Frasca 141 simulator flight test. The 
participant’s corrective actions were compared with the recommended 
procedures in the Piper Warrior pilot’s operating handbook and the FAA-
approved airplane flight manual (1995), and were recorded with numeric 
scores on a corrective action assessment form. A two-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) model with group and experience level as the main 
factors was used to analyze the difference of corrective action scores. The 
analysis indicated that the corrective action scores of the experiment and 
control groups were significantly different (F = 25.63, p < .0001). 
Recognition time for this study was measured from initiation of a trigger 
event until participant recognition of the event. If a participant did not 
recognize a trigger event after five minutes (300 seconds), their recognition 
time was reported as 300 seconds. Recognition times from this study were 
not normally distributed. Since non-normality violates one of the 
assumptions for parametric statistical models, ANOVA or regression models 
could not be considered appropriate for the analysis of recognition times. In 
this situation, a non-parametric statistical test can be used. One of the most 
frequently used non-parametric statistical tests is the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
(Hollander & Wolfe, 1999), and the results for this study are reported in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2. Kruskal-Wallis test results for recognition time analysis between groups 
Trigger Event DF Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square 
1 1 2.5546 0.1100 
2 1 9.5237 0.0020* 
3 1 2.0334 0.1539 
4 1 4.4361 0.0352* 
All 1 14.4857 0.0001* 
Note.α  =. 05 
 
Results from the Kruskal-Wallis Tests suggest that recognition times for 
trigger events 1 and 3 were not significantly different between the 
experimental and control groups. However, the recognition times for trigger 
events 2 and 4 were significantly different. Finally, the overall recognition 
time, which was the summed recognition times of trigger events 1, 2, 3, and 
4, was significantly different between the experimental and control groups. 
These results suggest that flight students exposed to periodic review of 
ADAM had shorter recognition times for abnormal aircraft conditions than 
non-exposed students.  
Response time for this study was measured from participant recognition 
of a simulated abnormal aircraft condition (trigger event) until the participant 
finished the corrective actions. If a participant made no corrective action 
after five minutes had elapsed (300 seconds), the response time was reported 
as 300 seconds. If a participant made corrective actions but none of the steps 
were correct, the response time was also reported as 300 seconds. Five 
participants (one in the experimental group and four in the control group) 
made corrective actions to trigger event 3, but none of their actions were 
correct. If a participant took corrective actions but the actions had a missed 
step, the ending point of the response time was recorded when the last 
correct action was made. Nine participants (four in the experiment group and 
five in the control group) made corrective actions with a missed action step 
in response to trigger event 1. Five participants (four in the experimental 
group and one in the control group) made corrective actions with a missed 
action step in response to trigger event 3. The response time data were found 
not normally distributed, similar to those seen in the recognition time data. 
Thus, the same methods used in recognition time analyses, the Kruskal-
Wallis Tests, were implemented in response time analyses as reported in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3. Kruskal-Wallis test results for response time analysis between groups 
Trigger Event DF Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square 
1 1 6.1305 0.0133* 
2 1 11.7060 0.0006* 
3 1 17.2231 <. 0001* 
4 1 1.7178 0.1900 
All 1 22.1079 <. 0001* 
Note. α  = .05 
  
The Kruskal-Wallis Test results suggest that response times to trigger 
events 1, 2, and 3 were significantly different between the experimental and 
control groups. However, the response time to trigger event 4 was not 
significantly different. Finally, the overall response time, which is the 
summed response time to trigger events 1, 2, 3, and 4, was significantly 
different between the experimental and control groups. These results suggest 
that the flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM information 
completed corrective actions to abnormal aircraft conditions in less time than 
did non-exposed students. Study findings suggest the following answers to 
the research questions: 
1. Flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM had shorter 
recognition times to the trigger events of high oil pressure and 
vacuum pump system failure than non-exposed students but not to 
the trigger events of alternator failure and high electrical load. The 
overall recognition time during abnormal aircraft conditions for 
flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM was shorter 
than the overall recognition time of non-exposed students.  
2. Flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM had shorter 
response times to the   trigger events of alternator failure, high oil 
pressure, and high electrical load than non-exposed students but not 
to vacuum pump system failure. The overall response time during 
abnormal aircraft conditions for flight students exposed to periodic 
review of ADAM was shorter than the overall response time of non-
exposed students. 
3. Flight students who periodically review ADAM took corrective 
action closer to the recommended solutions than those who did not.  
DISCUSSION 
Jensen (1995) says that people learn to expect certain things to happen 
from their awareness of predictable elements developed during situational 
experiences. Barber (1999) mentions situation awareness as anticipating and 
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considering future situations by monitoring, assessing, and evaluating the 
current situation. Barber also suggests that situation awareness is essential 
for the initial stages of problem detection, with information gathering and 
summarization providing the necessary tools for understanding a more 
complex situation that may not be straightforward or which may not have 
been previously experienced. The outcomes from this study support Barber’s 
work. Study participants who periodically reviewed safety information 
demonstrated enhanced situational awareness and recognized abnormal 
aircraft conditions sooner than the students who did not. Also, the corrective 
actions made by flight students who periodically reviewed this safety 
information were more appropriate than those made by the students who did 
not. Finally, the SJT results indicated that flight students who periodically 
reviewed safety information made more appropriate decisions to abnormal 
flight conditions that they had not previously experienced (many of the 
scenarios described in SJT were not cases that the study participants would 
normally encounter in a collegiate flight environment). 
 Hart (1988) notes that recognition and interpretation of incoming 
sensory information requires transformation based on expectations, 
information processing, previous experience, and knowledge of the current 
situation. In addition, Boff, Kaufman, and Thomas (1986) suggest that 
perception is the process by which particular relationships among potentially 
separate stimulus elements are determined and in turn guide the 
interpretation of those elements. The findings of this study indicate that 
flight students who periodically reviewed safety information recognized 
abnormal aircraft conditions in shorter time than the students who did not. 
Also, the corrective actions for abnormal aircraft conditions, made by the 
flight students who periodically reviewed the safety information, were more 
appropriate than the corrective actions made by the students who did not. 
These results suggest that regular access to safety information enhances 
flight students’ recognition of abnormal aircraft conditions.  
Orasanu and Connolly (1993), advocates of naturalistic decision 
making, say that decision makers use their knowledge to organize a problem, 
interpret the situation, and define what information is needed to formulate a 
solution. This process helps the decision maker complete a speedy 
assessment by searching, selecting, and interpreting relevant information. 
One of the findings of this study (recognition time) is that flight students 
who periodically review safety information make faster assessments of 
abnormal aircraft conditions than those who do not. The study findings also 
suggest that flight students who periodically review safety information make 
a more accurate interpretation of relevant information and are more likely to 
select correct actions.  
Ritchie (1988) reports that, depending upon the nature of the display and 
the pilot’s ability to use it, the pilot may be able to process visually provided 
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information at prodigious rates. One of the study finding areas, recognition 
time, supports this conclusion. The first trigger event of alternator failure 
during the Frasca 141 simulator flight tests had two types of indicators 
displaying the system failure: alternator failure warning light and ammeter. 
The other trigger events did not have system failure warning lights. The 
research findings show that the recognition time for the trigger event of 
alternator failure was much shorter (mean 11.17 seconds) than the 
recognition times for other trigger events (high oil pressure: mean 108.50 
seconds; high load meter: mean 98.71 seconds; vacuum pump failure: mean 
29.12 seconds). This result suggests the relative importance of a warning 
light in detecting system failures. 
Inagaki, Takae, and Moray (1999) assert that a large number of flying 
hours do not define an expert, unless those hours include a variety of normal 
and abnormal experiences which lead to better judgment. In this study, 
participants were assigned to one of the three experience levels based on 
their flight education progress. Participants’ total flight experience ranged 
from about 82 hours to 208 hours (at the beginning of this study), and each 
experience level had a range of about 50 to 70 hours total flight time. Study 
results suggest that there was no apparent significant impact of experience 
level on participant performance across all four areas that were monitored 
(adherence to a recommended solution, recognition time of an abnormal 
aircraft condition, appropriateness of response, and response time). This 
supports the notion that participants’ experience levels were not greatly 
varied for this study.  
Finally, flight simulator results for trigger event 4 (vacuum pump 
failure) did not demonstrate significant difference in response time between 
the experimental and control groups. The nature of the simulated failure 
could provide a possible explanation for this lack of difference between the 
groups. The vacuum system of an aircraft provides pneumatic power to 
several of the primary flight instruments. One of these instruments is the 
attitude indicator which provides the pilot with a primary reference for pitch 
and roll movements. The failure of the vacuum system is primarily indicated 
through a vacuum gage on the instrument panel but might also be recognized 
by the erratic performance of the attitude indicator. Once the vacuum pump 
was failed in the simulation, the vacuum pressure indication on the gage 
dropped immediately to zero. This was followed by the attitude indicator 
slowly becoming erratic, a condition that would be quickly noticed by the 
pilot. Thus, the participants from either the experimental group or control 
group who did not recognize the dropped in vacuum pressure indication 
might recognize the vacuum pump failure from the erratic attitude indicator 
display. Once they recognized the vacuum pump failure, the only possible 
step for the corrective action was to turn on the electrical vacuum pump 
switch. The lack of notable difference between the experimental and control 
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group responses may be attributable to the fact that more than one indicator 
of vacuum failure existed providing enhanced opportunity for identification 
of the problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated whether safety information has a beneficial 
effect on aeronautical decision making for students in a collegiate flight 
program. Researchers monitored a group of flight students who periodically 
reviewed ADAM (safety information) and a group of flight students who did 
not. The data collected included participant responses in terms of: (a) 
adherence to a recommended solution, (b) recognition time of an abnormal 
aircraft condition, (c) appropriateness of response, and (d) response time. 
Research findings suggest that flight students who periodically reviewed 
ADAM completed more timely and effective responses to the four 
malfunction areas monitored during the study. Study participants who 
periodically reviewed ADAM also made decisions and took actions that 
were closer to the solutions recommended by aviation experts than students 
who did not have access to ADAM.  
Study findings suggest that flight students who periodically reviewed 
safety information demonstrated an improved capacity for aeronautical 
decision making ability in comparison to those who did not. Although any 
generalization of these findings to all pilot trainee populations may be 
premature, they do represent an important area for further investigation. A 
safety information system similar to the one used during this study may not 
only assist in tracking of aircraft discrepancies for maintenance purposes, but 
also provide a valuable enhancement to pilot decision making for all flight 
training programs. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes an interactive multimedia simulator for air transportation 
bomb threat training. The objective of this project is to improve the air 
transportation sector’s capability to respond to bomb threats received by 
commercial airports and aircraft. The simulator provides realistic training on 
receiving and responding to a variety of bomb threats that might not otherwise be 
possible due to time, cost, or operational constraints. Validation analysis indicates 
that the use of the simulator resulted in statistically significant increases in 
individual ability to respond to these types of bomb threats.   
INTRODUCTION 
The vulnerability of air transportation facilities and aircraft in 
flight has recently been underscored by the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks. While the impact of this tragedy focused attention 
on hijacking type of attacks, there are actually a number of 
categories of aviation terrorism. These include hijackings; bomb 
threats, attempted bombings and bombings; shooting at aircraft in 
flight; and attacks on airports. This paper describes a research 
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effort to improve the nation’s ability to respond to bomb threats directed 
towards airports and aircraft in flight.   
When a bomb threat is directed towards an air transportation facility or 
an aircraft in flight, even organizations with bomb threat response training 
may fail to respond effectively due to a lack of familiarity or practice. One 
reason for this is that proper bomb threat response exercises must include 
notification and coordination procedures, a bomb search, and evacuation and 
reentry of the area (BATF, 1987; Brodie, 1979; McCarthy & Quigley, 1992; 
Reilly, 1989). When conducted in an actual environment, these activities can 
constitute significant losses of operational time for the airline or airport 
involved in the exercise. As a result, it is simply unrealistic to expect many 
air transportation organizations to practice bomb threat response exercises 
enough to become sufficiently proficient. On the other hand, any air 
transportation organization which does not have comprehensive bomb threat 
response training nor conducts regular exercises is subject to more severe 
casualties, property damage, and loss of operational time in an actual 
bombing. Thus, the problem is how to develop a bomb threat response 
capability that reduces the severity of casualties, property damage, and loss 
of organizational productivity in the event of an actual bombing without at 
the same time losing additional operational time due to bomb threat response 
training. 
RELEVANT LITERATURE 
A literature search was conducted to identify efforts with direct 
relevance to this effort. The search yielded three major categories of relevant 
past efforts. The first category includes a large number of efforts involving 
the simulation analysis of airport operations. Representative efforts include 
terminal operations, departure gate assignment, ticketing counters, and 
passenger loading (Chung & Gopalakrishnan, 2003; Chung & Sodeinde, 
2000; Gu & Chung, 1999; Setti & Hutchinson, 1994; Van Landeghem & 
Beuselinck, 2002). While all of these types of research efforts utilize 
simulation technology, they are do not directly address any aspects of 
responding to bomb threats directed at either air transportation facilities or in 
flight commercial aircraft. 
The second category includes a variety of simulation related research 
efforts directed at improving emergency response efforts. These include 
CriSys management training software system (Sullivan, 1992), an 
emergency evacuation simulation model (Weinroth, 1989) and a group of 
virtual reality simulators involving military ordnance, nuclear weapons, and 
improvised explosive devices (Kiernan, 1994; Regan, 1995; O’Brien, 
personnel communication, June 11, 1997; Ryan-Jones, 1995; 1997). The 
CriSys software focuses on post-incident simulator management training of 
 Chung and Marwaha 19 
 
 
crisis teams on chemical plant explosions and other disasters. The evacuation 
simulation model involves the simulation analysis of emergency evacuation 
routes in large buildings. The virtual reality simulators consist of simulator 
training programs for rendering safe ordnance by bomb disposal technicians.  
While these research efforts all involve the use of simulator training for 
emergency response, none focus directly on improving bomb threat 
response. 
The third category of relevant research efforts includes a series of 
interactive training simulators directed at improving an organization’s ability 
to respond to bomb threats. These include bomb threat training simulators 
for offices (Chung & Huda, 1999), medical clinics (Chung, 2000) and land 
transportation facilities (Chung & Panjrath, 2001). The literature search 
yielded a number of interactive training simulators associated with 
emergency response procedures. However, none of these simulators 
addressed the special issues associated with air transportation facilities or 
aircraft in flight.   
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Bomb threats and bombs on aircraft in flight represent a significant issue 
to the safe and effective operation of commercial air transportation 
operations. Despite the high consequences of failure in responding to these 
types of situations; training costs and scheduling, as well as operational 
limitations remain a significant challenge. To help improve the commercial 
air transportation sector’s ability to respond to bomb threats and bombs on 
aircraft in flight, this research effort designed, developed, and validated an 
interactive multimedia Air Transportation Bomb Threat Training Simulator. 
This simulator provides commercial air carriers with the opportunity to 
obtain realistic training on receiving and responding to a variety of bomb 
threats that might not otherwise be possible due to time, cost, or operational 
constraints. 
METHOD 
This section addresses the methodology used in the design, 
development, and validation of the Air Transportation Bomb Threat Training 
Simulator. The Participants section describes the different categories of 
individuals that participated in different phases of the research effort. The 
Materials section describes the design and development of the training 
simulator. The Procedure section describes the methodology used to assess 
the training validity of the simulator. 
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Participants 
Two distinct types of participants were utilized in the research effort. 
The first type was used to assess the face validity of the training simulator. 
This population consisted of several U.S. government-trained bomb disposal 
officers. By virtue of their training and professional experience, these 
individuals were considered to be knowledgeable on the subject of bomb 
threats. Their involvement consisted of ensuring that the training simulator 
appeared to represent reality sufficiently for training purposes. The second 
type of participant was the test population. These participants were used to 
determine the training validity of the simulator. These individuals consisted 
of a group of engineering graduate students at the University of Houston. 
This population was presumed to be not knowledgeable on the subject of 
responding to bomb threats in airports and aircraft.   
 
Materials 
The materials section describes the design and development of the 
training simulator. This section specifically includes the System Description 
and the Scenario Operation. The System Description section includes a 
general description of the major components of the simulator. The Scenario 
Operation section describes the sequence of events that a user would 
experience during a training session.   
 
System description 
The Air Transportation Bomb Threat Training Simulator is an 
interactive multimedia application developed in Macromedia’s Authorware 
7.0. Authorware is a powerful software design program which facilitates the 
development of mission critical applications (Macromedia, 2003). 
Authorware is particularly effective in incorporating multimedia features 
such as wave sound files, animation, and interactive objects. Figure 1 
illustrates the opening screen of the simulator. 
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Figure 1.  Opening screen of the interactive multimedia training simulator for responding 
to air transportation bomb threats  
 
 
 
The simulator consists of instructional, training, and testing components. 
The instructional component provides static non-interactive screen by screen 
instruction on receiving and responding to bomb threats. The module is 
based on both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) bomb 
threat and physical security planning pamphlet and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) operational procedures. 
The training component provides the user with interactive training on 
receiving and responding to bomb threats from the perspective of the person 
receiving the threat. When the module is run, it allows the user to select the 
type and location of the bomb threat on which the user would like to receive 
training. There are scenarios involving bomb threats directed at commercial 
airport passenger gate areas, commercial aircraft at the loading gate, and 
commercial aircraft in flight. Once the user has selected the category of 
scenario, the program will generate scenario parameters such as background 
information, whether or not the threat is real, where the suspect devices is, 
and when the device will function. There are ten base scenarios in each 
category. The individual scenarios are based on data collected from actual 
bomb threat incidents. The parameters in each scenario are randomized.  
This means that each time the simulator is run, the user is presented with a 
different situation that requires a unique solution. On completion of the 
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scenario generation, the user is positioned in a first person environment and 
the interactive scenario begins.   
The testing component consists of randomized automated multiple 
choice pretests and posttests. Under normal conditions, the user takes the 
pretest prior to using the training simulator. After using the simulator, the 
user can take the posttest. Each time the user takes the pretest or the posttest, 
the program randomizes the questions. This is designed to minimize the 
possibility of memorizing answers to the questions. On completion of the 
posttest, the program will automatically score both the pretest and the 
posttest. The program will also determine the increase or decrease between 
the two tests. Both training supervisors and individual users can use the 
testing component as a guide for assessing the level of user proficiency. 
 
Scenario operation 
In the case of an aircraft in flight scenario, the user is placed in the 
cockpit of a commercial jetliner. The program provides a background 
scenario briefing. The purpose of the briefing is to provide a frame of 
reference for recent bomb threats directed at the airline. Figure 2 illustrates 
this screen. 
Figure 2. Example of scenario briefing screen of the Interactive Multimedia Training 
Simulator for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb Threats  
 
 
When this screen is cleared, the program issues the bomb threat to the 
user. With the aircraft in flight scenario, the flight crew is contacted by radio 
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with details of the bomb threat. This effect is achieved by playing a wave 
file. Once the user is given the details of the threat, the user then has the 
opportunity to try to obtain additional information from the control tower. 
This includes attempting to ask the following questions: 
1. Who is the caller? 
2. What does the bomb look like? 
3. Where is the bomb? 
4. When is it going to explode? 
5. Why was the bomb placed? 
6. How will the bomb go off? 
If this information is available, the simulator will respond to these 
questions by playing additional wave sound files. When the call is 
terminated, three buttons pop up on the bottom of the desk screen. These 
buttons allow the user to make an initial decision to ignore or search the 
aircraft. This screen is illustrated in Figure 3. If the user either ignores the 
threat or runs out of time, the program immediately evaluates the user’s 
performance on gathering information and responding to the threat. In the 
event that the threat was real, the user fails the scenario. 
Figure 3. Example of a cockpit screen of the Interactive Multimedia Training Simulator  
for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb Threats  
 
If the user decides to search the aircraft, he or she is presented with a 
diagram of the aircraft. Users may search different areas of the aircraft by 
clicking on the corresponding part of the diagram. This screen is illustrated 
in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Example of a search diagram screen of the Interactive Multimedia Training 
Simulator for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb Threats  
 
Users can then search for suspect devices by clicking on different 
objects in the selected part of the aircraft. This module retains a high degree 
of realism by using both digitized photographs of the aircraft and different 
interactive objects. For example, clicking on a seat will cause it to be lifted 
to allow the user to search underneath for suspect devices. Similarly, clicking 
on a compartment in the aircraft head will cause the door to swing open for 
inspection.  This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Example of  aircraft search screen of the Interactive Multimedia Training 
Simulator for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb Threats  
 
When an object is examined, a sound wave file is played related to the 
status of the object. A harmless object would provide a sound file of a 
comment such as, “I know who that belongs to” or “That’s ok.” Similarly, a 
suspect device would yield a sound file of a comment such as, “Where did 
that come from?” or “That doesn’t belong here.” The program records the 
number of possible objects examined by the user. This statistic is later used 
to determine the completeness of the search effort. 
In the event that a suspect device is found, the user must move the 
device to the least risk bomb location. This position is where a suspect 
device will have the least effect in the event of a detonation. Once the 
suspect device is positioned, the user must then properly prepare the least 
risk bomb location to best protect the passengers. This is accomplished by 
following specific procedures for barricading the device with material on 
hand. 
The evacuation module is typically activated by the user when a search 
has resulted in the discovery of a suspect device. This module presents a 
diagram of the aircraft similar to that used during the search process. This 
time however, the user must decide how to position the passengers on the 
plan to minimize injuries in the event of a detonation. Normally users will 
want to evacuate the passengers to a point furthest away from the suspect 
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device which is now positioned at least risk bomb location on the aircraft.  
The evacuation screen is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6.  Example of safe zone evacuation screen of the Interactive Multimedia Training 
Simulator for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb Threats  
 
On either the completion of the scenario or the detonation of the device, 
the user is evaluated for their information collection, searching, and 
evacuation performance. Feedback on the user’s performance is provided 
through both a summary screen and individual detailed screens. This 
feedback allows users to improve their ability to respond to the bomb threat. 
Training supervisors can also use this information to target future bomb 
threat training.  The summary evaluation screen is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  Example of a summary evaluation screen of the Interactive Multimedia 
Training Simulator for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb Threats  
 
 
Procedure 
In this type of research effort, the methodology procedure consists of 
establishing the validity of the simulator. With traditional simulation models, 
the validation process may include both an assessment of face validity and a 
quantitative comparison of behavior between the real world and the 
simulation model systems. With training simulators, the face validity 
assessment can still be performed; however the quantitative comparison 
between systems must be approached differently. Here, an assessment of 
training validity must be conducted. This is a quantitative comparison of 
whether or not the simulator adequately represents reality for the user to 
exhibit the same or increased user performance in the task that the simulator 
is designed to simulate. Thus, if the simulator is able to demonstrate equal or 
improved training effectiveness with users, then it can be considered to have 
training validity from the standpoint of adequately representing the real 
system. 
Both face validation and training validation assessment were performed 
on the simulator. The face validation was achieved through a process of 
continuous review and improvement over a period of several months with 
the assistance of the Houston Police Department’s Bomb Squad. The 
quantitative methodology was based on the use of pretests and posttests and 
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examination of the test scores using the paired t-test approach (Remus, 
1981). The pretest and the posttest were based on information from the 
BATF Bomb Threat and Physical Security pamphlet and FAA 
documentation. The test consisted of twenty multiple choice questions on 
receiving and responding to bomb threats. The split half reliability of this test 
was 0.82. The test was face validated by representatives of the FAA.   
As identified in the Participants subsection of the Method section, the 
test population to determine the training validity was a group of engineering 
graduate students at the University of Houston. This population was 
presumed to be not knowledgeable on the subject of responding to bomb 
threats in airports and aircraft. After an orientation session, the pretest was 
administered to the class. The test group then ran multiple training scenarios 
with the simulator. After the completion of this phase, test group were given 
the posttest. 
RESULTS 
The results for the pretest and the posttest for the test group are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Pretest and posttest results for test participants of training validation of the 
Interactive Multimedia Training Simulator for Responding to Air Transportation Bomb 
Threats  
 Pretest Posttest 
Number of test participants 26 26 
Mean score of participants 32.88 69.42 
Standard deviation of scores  13.86 19.14 
 
The pretest and posttest scores were paired between individuals.  The 
formal hypotheses are: 
 
Null Hypothesis: There is no gain between the pretest and post test scores 
Alternative Hypothesis: There is a gain between the pretest and post test scores 
 
The difference in gain between the pretest and the posttest was calculated 
and a paired t-test was executed at an alpha level of 0.05. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Difference in gain between pretest and posttest of test participants of training 
validation of the Interactive Multimedia Training Simulator for Responding to Air 
Transportation Bomb Threats   
 t statistic t critical  
(1 tail, a=0.05) 
t significance 
Paired t-test  10.22 1.708 0.000 
 
The qualitative analysis of the training validity of the simulator was 
based on a paired t-test between the pretests and posttests from the test 
group. The critical value for a one tailed test at an alpha of 0.05 is 1.708.  
The paired t-test resulted in a test statistic of 10.22. Since the test statistic 
was greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. This means 
that there is a statistically significant gain between the pretest and posttest 
scores at an alpha level of 0.05. Thus, there is evidence that the use of the 
simulator had an impact on how well the test group learned to respond to 
bomb threats of this type. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
Bomb threats directed at airports and aircraft in flight can result in 
significant losses of operational time. In the event of an actual device there 
may also be casualties and property damage. By maintaining an effective 
level of bomb threat response training, air transportation organizations can 
help minimize the effects of bomb threats regardless of whether the threat 
involves an actual device or not. Unfortunately, due to time, cost, or 
operational considerations, many airports and airlines are simply not able to 
receive and maintain effective levels of bomb threat training. 
The Air Transportation Bomb Threat Training Simulator was designed 
to overcome these limitations. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
the simulator has established its training validity. Thus, the Air 
Transportation Bomb Threat Training Simulator provides the opportunity for 
the commercial airlines industry to provide realistic and effective training in 
receiving and responding to bomb threats that might not otherwise be 
possible. While the testing at the University of Houston was performed 
under a controlled environment, it is expected that the same level of training 
effectiveness and acceptance will be present in the field environment. 
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DISCOVERING THE REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 
OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: 
INTERVIEWING THE AVIATION RULEMAKING 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
 
Chien-tsung Lu 
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Warrensburg, Missouri 
ABSTRACT 
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training for aviation mechanics has 
become mandatory in many industrialized countries since 1998. Yet, to date, MRM 
training remains optional in the U.S. Interestingly, a similar safety discipline, 
namely Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), is mandatory for pilots, flight 
engineers, flight attendants, and dispatchers and is regulated in the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). If MRM training is 
important to enhance aviation technicians’ working behavior, the rationale to not 
regulate it opens a window for study. This research aims to inductively investigate 
the FAA’s regulatory rationale concerning MRM training based on direct inputs 
from the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) members. 
Delphi methodology associated with purposive sampling technique was adopted. 
The result revealed that the FAA cannot regulate MRM because the aviation 
industry is strongly opposed to it due to the lack of training budgets, the need of a 
quantifiable cost-effect analysis, concern over the FAA’s inspection workforce, an 
ongoing voluntary alternative called the Air Transportation Surveillance System 
(ATOS), the government’s lower priority on maintenance after 9/11, and the 
airlines’ tight embracement of operational flexibility without regulation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Alongside the prompt development of the air transportation system in 
the U.S., aviation safety has always been the foremost concern of the 
government (Carmody, 2001; Donnelly, 2001), the general public (Bowers, 
1997; Wells, 1999), as well as the air transportation industry itself (Proctor,  
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1999). Since 1978, the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act (the nature of 
laissez-faire and free marketing) has forced airlines to further promote, or at 
least maintain, a required level of safety in order to compete with business 
rivals, to provide better operations, to survive, and most importantly, to 
become profitable (Button & Stough, 2000; Chang, 1986; Marks, 1999). 
However, today’s airline passengers tend to book their flights based on price 
either via the Internet or from traditional travel agencies (Johnston, 2001). In 
response, airlines have reacted by providing services that charge the lowest 
possible fares in order to attract more customers and ultimately survive in the 
Darwinian post-deregulation battlefield. However, maintaining a risk-free 
operation needs a sufficient financial backup. While charging passengers 
airfare with marginal or no profit, airlines may provide safety training for 
their employees only to satisfy the minimum mandatory requirements from 
the FAA. Providing non-regulatory safety training could become a financial 
burden to airlines. 
REVIEW OF MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY 
TRAINING 
The accident investigation of the fatal mishap of Alaska Airlines Flight 
261 in January 2000 is pointing to flawed jackscrew lubrication and rushed 
inspection (Finnegan, 2002; Fiorino, 2001). After Alaska Airlines’ accident, 
many aviation enthusiasts see again that the goal of zero accidents cannot be 
achieved without the cooperation of  hazard-free maintenance. The fact is 
that Alaska Airlines’ accident, which may be a result of non-flight errors, is 
not an isolated case in aviation history. The accidents of TWA Flight 800, 
ValuJet Flight 592, and Air Midwest Flight 5481 had alerted the air 
transportation industry that non-flight operation does play a significant role 
in today’s aviation safety (Lu, 2001; Alexander, 2004). As a result, the task 
of eliminating non-flight errors cannot be overemphasized. 
 
Maintenance Human Errors 
The main purpose of aircraft maintenance is to keep aircraft airworthy 
(King, 1986). Although technologies have been enhanced, aircraft 
maintenance remains quite challenging and the working environment is still 
extremely intense (Butterworth-Hayes, 1997; Delp, Watkins, & Kroes, 1994; 
Richardson, Rodwell, & Baty, 1995). With this in mind, human factors 
affecting maintenance performance are inherent and should be treated 
carefully. A survey conducted by Boeing Company and other safety 
researchers revealed that the main factors contributing to maintenance 
mistakes were the following: (a) boredom; (b) failure to understand 
instructions well; (c) rushing; (d) pressure from management; (e) fatigue; (f) 
distractions at critical times; (g) shift work; (h) poor communication; (i) use 
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of incorrect parts and tools; and (j) unauthorized maintenance proceedings 
(Al-Almoudi, 1998; Taylor & Christensen, 1998). In addition, Transport 
Canada’s human factors research resulted in the recognition of a so-called 
Dirty Dozen—lack of communication, lack of teamwork, lack of knowledge, 
lack of resource, lack of assertiveness, lack of awareness, fatigue, stress, 
distraction, pressure, complacency, and workplace norms—that identifies the 
human factors requiring immediate attention (Grant, 1995). Wood (1997) 
and Drury (1999; n.d.) echoed this and further reported the major problems 
of aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs)—fatigue, physical impediment, 
foreign object damage, ignorance, misconduct, and overlook—when 
conducting aircraft maintenance/inspections. Hence, when working on an 
aircraft, AMTs could make mistakes and are not error-free (Wood, 1997). 
The nature of aircraft maintenance is complex and needs physical and 
mental strength. The working climate is tense, involving managerial 
pressure, working efficiency, shift work, interpersonal communication, and 
external sociological influences (Lu, 2001). Without a doubt, the 
maintenance issues associated with human factors are almost identical to 
those that affect flight performance—communication, workload, fatigue, 
stress, social environment, physical limitations, and personal health (Orlady 
& Orlady, 1999). 
 
Maintenance Resource Management 
Like CRM training for pilots and associated flight crews, MRM was 
developed based on the experimental findings of human factors research 
introduced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
in the early 1970s. Human factors studies the interaction between human and 
software (S), hardware (H), environment (E), and liveware (L), thereby 
forming the SHEL model of aviation safety theory (Krause, 1996; see Figure 
1).  
Figure 1. SHEL Model of human factor and aviation safety.1 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Krause, S. S., 1996, Aircraft safety – accident investigations, analyses, & applications and 
Federal Aviation Administration, 2000, System safety handbook: Practices and guidelines for 
conducting system safety engineering and management. 
Hardware 
Software 
Liveware 
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Likewise, maintenance human factors training is an analytical science of the 
factors influencing maintenance performance and consequently seeks to 
eliminate or dilute the negative impact from an explicit safety factor (Orlady 
& Orlady, 1999). Because MRM training originated in the findings of human 
factors research, implementing MRM training could help improve an AMT’s 
performing compatibility, self-awareness, interpersonal communication, and 
effectiveness at resource usage (Capitelli, 1988; Lavitt, 1995; Mudge, 1998; 
Orlady & Orlady, 1999). 
 
Legislative Basis for MRM Training 
Not until 1988, and after Aloha Airlines’ accident resulting from the 
aircraft’s aged fuselage being ripped open in flight, did the FAA conduct the 
first official safety meeting concerning aircraft maintenance. As a result, 
Congress proposed a bill—the Aviation Safety Research Act (H.R. 4686)—
which was passed on November 3, 1988, by the Senate (Public Law 100-
591). This bill provided grants to the FAA and expanded the research 
domain aiming to make a connection between aviation safety and human 
factors (US GPO, 1990). The Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 sought 
to pursue the relationship between human factors and flying, aviation 
maintenance, and air traffic control (US GPO, 1997). The FAR Part 121 
Subpart N and Special FAR Part 71 Training Program has regulated today’s 
CRM training rooted in the human factors paradigm for flight crews (pilots 
and flight engineers) since 1990. The Aviation Safety Research Act was 
revised in 1996, mandating human factor training for flight attendants and 
dispatchers.  
Moreover, in 1991, three years after the Aloha Airlines accident, 
Congress passed the Airline Passenger Safety Enhancement Act, which 
focused on improving airline maintenance procedures and standards. This 
legislation urged airlines to: (a) reform inspection routines for aging aircraft, 
(b) innovate inspection technology training for maintenance personnel and 
professionalism, and (c) restructure a 15-year inspection development 
(Bowen & Lu, 2000). Unfortunately, Congress did not identify the 
sociological factor behind Aloha’s accident—the oppressive management 
pressure that constrained maintenance time (Friend, 1992). The fatal crash of 
ValuJet Flight 592 in 1996 was due to an oxygen canister fire resulting from 
ill-trained ground crews; it led to the passage of the Aviation Safety 
Protection Act of 1997. Congress proposed another bill, the Aircraft Safety 
Act of 2000 (H.R. 3862), after the tragedy involving Alaska Airlines Flight 
261 in January 2000. This legislative reaction, in the wake of another 
aviation disaster, aimed to prevent fraud involving aircraft maintenance and 
defective parts (Bowen & Lu, 2000). 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aviation industry (Capitelli, 1988; Lavitt, 1995; Orlady & Orlady, 
1999) and the FAA (Mudge, 1998) have recognized the benefit of MRM 
training to enhance aircraft maintenance safety. To date, MRM or an 
equivalent training is mandatory in EU nations (Joint Aviation Authority, 
2001) and Canada (Transport Canada, n.d.). A similar training (CRM) for 
flight crews, flight attendants, dispatchers, and flight engineers is mandated 
in the FAA’s FARs. With the legislative foundation upheld by the Aviation 
Safety Research Act, Passenger Safety Enhancement Act, and Aviation 
Safety Protection Act, the FAA’s non-regulatory stance in relation to MRM 
is worth investigating. Without a mandatory requirement, the current training 
status quo in the aviation industry should be made known to the flying public 
as well. 
Question 1: From the viewpoint of Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC) members, what is the rationale underpinning 
the non-regulatory status of Maintenance Resource Management 
(MRM) training for aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs)? 
Question 2: What is the de facto safety training and attitude of the 
airlines toward Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) 
training under the current non-regulatory status quo? 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to manifest sound theories regarding the rationale of the FAA’s 
decision making, the research questions were thoroughly explored through 
the use of a divergent approach, a qualitative methodology. The author 
selected the Delphi methodology and initiated purposive sampling skills. 
 
Delphi Techniques 
The Delphi method is an exploratory and discursive-format data 
collection tool that allows researchers to gain the highest creditability of data 
through reciprocal procedures (see Figure 2); Bellenger, Bernhardt, & 
Goldstucker, 1976; Rayens & Hahn, 2000; Zapka & Estabrook, 1999). In 
this study, the Delphi technique was directly applied to answer the research 
questions concerning the rationale of decision making and current industry-
wide MRM training. The existing policy determinants can be coined and 
epistemological relations among variables can be identified.  
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Figure 2. Research execution processing – the flowchart of policy Delphi  
 
 
 
Purposive Sampling 
In contrast to the widely recognized random sampling approach adopted 
in most quantitative studies, purposive sampling focuses on the heuristic 
exploration and in-depth interview of selected key informants who possess a 
direct connection to various essential data, practical experiences, and 
genuine resources (Babbie, 1998; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Key 
informants—as representative units rather than randomly selected samples 
(Bellenger, Bernhardt, & Goldstucker, 1976)—are those who are closely 
involved in the area being studied. In addition, the snowball technique was 
accompanied with the usage of purposive sampling because qualitative 
researchers often start their data collection from the accessible research sites 
of key informants (Babbie, 1998; Berg, 2001; Creswell, 1998; Maxwell, 
1996; Royer & Zarlowski, 1999).  
 
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee 
This study recruited FAA ARAC members as key informants. One of 
the attempts by the federal government to collect public opinion from 
external sources in order to assist policymaking was the passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA) of 1972 (Adamski & Doyle, 1999). Since 1972, the FAA has 
established various ARACs for different legislative issues such as aged 
aircraft, air traffic control, navigation system, cabin safety, flight operation, 
and maintenance safety. The purpose behind the FAA’s establishment of an 
1. Preliminary opinion 
collection and expert 
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2. Expert panel setting 
by purposive sampling 
3. Questionnaire 
generated 
6. Round two data 
collection and 
management 
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management 8. Consensus & 
reliability index 
5. First data analysis, 
propositions, and 
management 
7. 2nd Data analysis, 
propositions, and 
management 
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ARAC is to build a communicative channel between the federal government, 
the public, and the aviation industry under the power of the FACA. ARAC 
members are also assigned with a task that focuses on regulatory 
communication and harmonization between the FAA FARs, Canadian 
Aviation Regulation (CAR), and Europe’s Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR). 
This study selected fourteen ARAC members who worked with the FAA 
regarding mandatory maintenance human factors training (formerly 
proposed by the FAA as FAR Part 66). Unfortunately, three of the selected 
ARAC members could not participate in this study, resulting in an eleven-
member Delphi panel. 
 
Data evaluation methods 
Coding is a systematic procedure for finding the significant meanings, 
norms, or unique themes of texts by cross-references and comparisons 
(Creswell, 1998; Gough & Scott, 2000). For grounded-theory type 
qualitative research, like that which uses the Delphi methodology, the design 
of topical subquestions can be considered the blueprint of qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) and meaningful coding (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Tafoya, 1986). In this study, computer software is useful 
to examine the reliability of data analysis. EZ-Text software was applied to 
manage database and to compile the index of coding reliability (CDC, 1998).  
 
Reliability and validity of the research 
The reliability of this project rests in the category of research 
consistency in addition to EZ-Text’s index. This consistency involved the 
key researcher’s operational processes of Delphi techniques and the 
informants’ conformability of results (steps 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Figure 2). 
Moreover, in addition to external peer-review for validity during the 
questionnaire generation phase, personal biases were clarified and rich and 
thorough descriptions were collected (Berg & Latin, 1994; Creswell, 1998; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this study, in order to gain the highest validity 
and reliability, the initial findings were returned to ARAC panelists for 
review and consequently gained their conformity based on Delphi criterions. 
FINDINGS 
This section outlines the findings after two consecutive personal 
interviews over a six-month period. The key informants, aged between 36 
and 46 years old, have comprised the largest portion of the sample, whereas 
most panelists possess educational level with Bachelor of Science degrees or 
above. All panelists have more than 10 years of working experience in the 
aviation field. Eight of the 11 panelists have received MRM or human 
factors education before the date of the interviews. Panelists have 
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participated in the FAA’s rulemaking activities at least once each year, and 
most of them have taken part in the FAA’s rulemaking activities associated 
with maintenance safety regulations more than three times in the past. A 
brief analysis of the panelists’ backgrounds is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Demographic distribution of panelists (N=11) 
 Number (n**) Descriptor Percentage 
Age    
 6 36-46 years of age 54.5 
 2 47-58 years of age 18.1 
 3 59 years or older 27.4 
Education    
 1 High School diploma 9.1 
 1 Associate degree 9.1 
 3 Bachelor’s degree 26.3 
 5 Graduate degree 46.5 
 1 Doctorate degree 9.1 
Working experience    
 11 10 years or more 100.0 
ARAC activities    
 3 New member 27.3 
 8 Senior member 72.7 
MRM/HF training    
 4 Never received 36.3 
 7 Received 63.6 
Note.  N = total number of panelists 
** n denotes the number of particular panelists 
 
Question 1: From the viewpoint of Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC) members, what is the rationale underpinning the non-
regulatory status of Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training for 
aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs)? 
After the interviews and data coding process, the synthetic findings from 
the ARAC members were grounded. The panelists concurred that the 
following six policy determinants played a central role in the FAA’s 
rulemaking in light of the current non-mandatory MRM or maintenance 
human factors education.  
1. Budgetary constraints. The FAA should have to consider the possible 
cost and how that would impact the air transportation industry’s current and 
future financial status. In particular, air carriers are facing ongoing financial 
difficulties that impede them from accepting any new regulations. 
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2. Lacking a persuasive cost-benefit analysis result. There is no strong 
or virtually quantifiable data showing a positive cost-benefit result from 
MRM. Therefore, lacking sound evidence, the air transportation industry 
would be reluctant to support such regulation. 
3. The effective operation of the Air Transportation Oversight System. 
Despite its nature of volunteerism that requires the industry’s participation 
from the bottom-up, the ongoing safety inspection mechanism—ATOS—is 
sufficient in maintaining a reasonable degree of aircraft maintenance safety.  
4. The air transportation industry’s demand for operational flexibility. 
The air transportation industry demands more operational flexibility to 
accomplish safety goals without coercion from the government. In addition, 
different categories within the industry would like to conduct their own 
safety training that focuses on specific needs. The standardized procedures 
and activities of MRM could hinder creative means to accomplish the goal of 
maintenance safety. 
5. The FAA’s capacity and the capability of safety inspectors. The 
FAA’s safety inspection capacity and the capability of safety inspectors is 
one of the policy determinants that hampers the FAA in mandating MRM 
and the industry in upholding its proposed regulations. First, the FAA has 
long been criticized by the industry regarding the capability of their safety 
inspectors. Second, since the FAA is suffering manpower shortage of safety 
inspectors, new MRM regulations could worsen the situation since the FAA 
would have to dispatch more safety inspectors to scrutinize the industry’s 
MRM training compliance. 
6. Low policy priority. After 9/11, the FAA’s manpower and budgetary 
resources had been reallocated to airport security and related safety issues. 
Most regulatory proposals petitioned by the government are mainly in favor 
of enhancing airport security as well as homeland security. National security 
and anti-terrorism activities had outweighed the importance of regulating 
MRM or maintenance human factors training. 
 
Question 2: What is the de facto safety training and attitude of the airlines 
toward MRM training under the current non-regulatory status quo? 
Based on the ARAC key informants’ input, major air carriers voluntarily 
participate in the ATOS system; yet small/regional airlines and fixed based 
operators (FBOs) do not or only occasionally provide MRM or related 
training. Regardless of the major air carriers’ engagement in ATOS 
surveillance, “when considering the degree of MRM training without 
regulation, a voluntary MRM conducted by the industry seems sporadic,” as 
stated by one panelist. Some panelists echoed and noted that the most critical 
elements impeding the industry’s voluntary implementation of MRM 
training are: (a) current financial hardship; (b) a long-term unpredictable 
cost; and (c) unclear benefits. Therefore, “the industry would like to 
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continuously comment on MRM training via participation in rulemaking 
rather than by supporting MRM regulation,” as remarked by one panelist. 
Regarding Question 2 concerning the contemporary U.S. aviation industry’s 
training status without the regulatory enforcement, several important facts 
were discovered.  
1. A profit-driven industry. Airlines are believed to be “exclusively 
profit-driven” as remarked by one panelist. Hence, the airlines’ willingness 
to “conduct MRM training without federal enforcement is low due to cost 
concerns.” Another panelist stated that “the support of the top management 
and cost-benefit analyses” were considered essential for an airline to decide 
whether or not to implement voluntary safety trainings. “When something is 
non-regulatory it will be done only if the management sees a cost-effect 
case” as echoed by another panelist. “Regional airlines or small FBOs would 
not implement MRM due to a budgetary shortage” as addressed by one 
panelist. However, “the major airlines would like to implement such training 
voluntarily because these airlines already have good technical training 
programs and MRM is a natural extension” as another panelist replied. 
2. The pros and cons of a non-regulatory MRM status. There are some 
disadvantages of maintaining a non-regulatory MRM training, said the panel. 
One panelist pointed out that, “the lack of mandatory MRM training could 
be harmful and risky, and could impact maintenance safety in the long run.” 
Without a doubt, “safety training would enhance safety performance,” 
another panelist replied. Because MRM training focuses on human factors 
related to aircraft maintenance tasks, one panelists stated that “without MRM 
training, the AMTs might unintentionally perform tasks with risks.” Another 
panelist further warned and argued, “not until the industry had encountered 
severe aviation mishaps caused by maintenance errors would the industry 
recognize the importance of communication, teamwork, self-awareness, and 
the dangers of physical fatigue, mental stress, and coercive management.” In 
addition, one panelist stated, “without regulation of MRM or defined 
requirements, organizations wander all over the map in terms of an accurate 
path of [MRM] training.” Moreover, according to panelists’ feedback, there 
are also some advantages if MRM training remains optional in nature. One 
panelist argued, “to some extent, volunteer programs are more stringent than 
regulations.” It is simply because airline services “are influenced multi-
dimensionally” by customers’ changing needs. Therefore, “if training 
requirements are flexible and lax, customer service can be easily and 
continually improved in a timely manner” as echoed by another panelist. Of 
course, not being mandated to do the training means cost saving. One 
panelist stated that “without mandatory enforcement from the government, 
the airlines do not have to conduct safety training and can therefore save on 
operational costs.” The fact is that “a non-mandatory MRM means cost 
reduction,” stated by another panelist. 
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3. The attitude of the industry regarding a mandatory MRM. “The 
industry is opposed to a mandatory MRM training” as one panelist 
addressed. “The air transportation industry is also afraid of any regulations 
because the FAA would possibly take the advantage if they have the 
chance,” another panelist argued. Another panelist said that “any regulations 
without appropriate evidence, showing that MRM would create enough 
return on investments, would be denied” by the industry. Even within the 
regulatory sphere, the industry would “just implement enough training” for 
aircraft technicians as another panelist replied. In particular, while the FAA 
hoped to promote MRM training for aircraft maintenance technicians 
without regulation, “when it comes to the discussion of regulations, the air 
transportation industry would demand a thorough understanding of 
requirements beforehand, such as technical support, training duration, 
possible cost and benefit, and a quantifiable result,” said another panelist. 
 
Reliability Report 
To ensure the reliability of qualitative findings, EZ-Text’s index of 
coding reliability was measured after the completion of the second-round 
interview. According to EZ-Text’s manual (CDC, 1998) and Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) rule of coding reliability, the percentage of agreement 
between two coded datasets should exceed 90 percent in order to ensure 
reliability. In addition, the Kappa Index should show 1 in the contingency 
table. In Table 2, the percentage of agreement regarding each code (policy 
determinant) is above 98 percent and the Kappa index is 1. This means that 
the coding process of raw data had high reliability across two codebooks. 
Table 2. Reliability Report—Kappa Index 
Codes Percentage of Agreement Kappa Index 
Financial constraint 99.373 1 
Cost-benefit analysis 98.746 1 
ATOS 99.373 1 
FAA's ability 99.687 1 
Operational flexibility 99.373 1 
Policy priority 98.746 1 
 
 
 Lu 43 
 
 
DISCUSSION: THE MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING 
The findings portray a conceptual picture for readers and pull most 
possible independent variables (policy determinants) together arriving at a 
description of the FAA’s rulemaking rationale regarding a mandatory MRM 
training. A schematic chart of relations showing a theoretical construct (from 
processing phase of policy premise finding, agenda setting, implementing 
policy action, to policy evaluation) among all found themes and policy 
determinants is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Schematic relationship among variables 
 
To further explain, this model of decision-making indicates that if the 
financial condition of the aviation industry was healthy or generating 
sufficient profits, the results of cost-benefit analyses would become less 
important. This is because the industry would then have enough monetary 
resources to implement MRM training. Furthermore, regardless of regulatory 
status, without sound evidence yielded from cost-benefit analyses, the 
willingness of supporting a mandatory MRM training is weak because the 
element of budgetary constraint is not compressed nor eliminated.  
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The aviation industry is tightly embracing ATOS on a voluntary basis. 
In addition, the demand for operational flexibility from the air transportation 
industry positively influences the FAA’s decision making. These two 
elements (ATOS and operational flexibility) are impediments to the 
industry’s acceptance of MRM regulation. Certainly, the air transportation 
industry would prefer to maintain the current voluntary nature of its 
cooperation with the FAA without the threat of violations. In addition, the 
industry is concerned with the capacity of FAA’s safety inspectors. The 
shortage and quality of the safety inspectors has been a long-time criticism 
of the FAA’s enforcement actions. If this manpower deficit can be removed, 
some of the resistance of MRM regulation from the industry could be 
reduced. Finally, the FAA will need to take priorities into account when 
enforcing the MRM agenda, especially in light of other priorities resulting 
from 9/11.  
It is believed that—barring a legislative crisis such as a major airline 
accident resulted from the lack of MRM training—these six rulemaking 
determinants largely shape the FAA’s decision-making behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
The core argument of this study is that while resource management or 
human factors training is mandatory for pilots, flight engineers, dispatchers, 
and flight attendants, it is controversial that such training becomes optional 
for AMTs or non-flight workers. A nonregulatory MRM also draws attention 
to the current training status for AMTs. This study has explored the rationale 
behind the FAA’s stance in retaining a non-regulatory MRM or maintenance 
human factors training for the air transportation industry. 
Based on the interview of ARAC members, policy determinants are 
unveiled showing that the FAA should closely evaluate several essential 
issues of the industry when it comes to the debate of proposed regulations. 
Those determinants are identified as (a) the industry’s financial status; (b) a 
sound evidence of cost-benefit analysis; (c) the scope of malleability of the 
ongoing voluntary ATOS; (d) the allowance of operational flexibility for the 
industry; (e) the FAA’s inspection capacity and the ability of inspectors; and 
(f) the level of policy priority. 
Regarding the current training status without regulatory enforcement, 
major air carriers are willing to voluntarily participate in the alternative 
system, namely ATOS. Yet, the regional airlines and FBOs do not intend to 
provide MRM to maintenance technicians due to the cost. Despite the major 
air carriers’ efforts, when considering the degree of MRM training without 
regulation, voluntary MRM conducted by the entire airline industry seems 
rare and difficult. While the industry as a whole does not likely support the 
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MRM regulation, only major airlines with more cash flow or revenue would 
be able to incorporate MRM into their current maintenance safety training.  
Post-9/11, the financial status of the entire industry is increasingly 
fragile. Although ATOS requires a reasonable amount of MRM training for 
non-flight employees, top management would still evaluate the possible 
investment returns in safety training before taking further action. As a result, 
when MRM is non-regulatory, it will be done only when the advantages are 
identified or when sound evidence associated with cost-benefit analyses is 
accessible. 
Finally, it is still possible to regulate MRM training in the future. The 
evidence underpinning this conclusion is the six policy determinants 
described. In other words, when any of the determinants prevails—that is, (a) 
the industry is making enough profits; (b) cost-benefit analysis shows a 
sound result; (c) the FAA has sufficient numbers of qualified inspectors; (d) 
the ATOS does not work well; (e) the FAA decides to grant the industry with 
operational flexibility; or (f) the government is aware of the urgency of such 
regulation—regulating MRM or related ground safety training would 
encounter less resistance. 
 
Limitation 
The results of this study were retrieved from two consecutive rounds of 
interviews with selected panelists from ARAC members who were closely 
involved in the debate of MRM regulation with the FAA. Unfortunately, one 
important resource—FAA’s rule-makers—was not able to take part in this 
research due to a variety of reasons. Thus, future research should focus on 
the data collection and comparison from the FAA rule-makers. Moreover, 
although panelists addressed that the working culture may change if 
technicians receive MRM or maintenance human factors training, evidence 
of this has not been recorded nor is it accessible. The cost-benefit analysis of 
MRM training did play a crucial role in this study. To prepare a report for 
the FAA’s future decision-making, follow-up research should focus on a 
longitudinal assessment of behavioral change, error reduction, and cost 
savings affiliated with MRM training. 
 
Special Notice 
Many aviation researchers have argued that the FAA has been captured 
by the industry (Carmichael, Kutz, & Brown, 2003) based on George J. 
Stigler’s theory. In this study, regardless of the designated personnel from 
the FAA in charge with a specific regulatory provision, the author reviewed 
the backgrounds of ARAC members and discovered that most ARAC 
members are mainly from the industry such as unions, airlines, aviation 
organizations, and manufacturers. As a result of this study, the FAA’s 
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decision-making process was, to a great extent, in favor of the industry and 
was captured accordingly.  
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ABSTRACT 
Competition in the European airline industry is currently fierce in the face of 
depressed demand conditions, and in the wake of privatizations and liberalization. 
The Portuguese flag carrier, TAP Air Portugal, operates within this environment. It 
is a medium sized carrier that was part of the defunct Qualiflyer Group alliance and 
has recently joined the Star Alliance. It controls more than 50% of the air market 
between Europe and Brazil and Europe and Angola. Nevertheless, it has been 
experiencing financial losses. One reason for this is that, following the reasoning of 
Ronald Coase (1946), it is difficult for any company with decreasing average costs 
to recover full costs in a highly competitive market. One way of approaching the 
problem is to establish quasi-monopoly power and airlines have done this through 
such things as frequent flyer programs and hub-and-spoke operations. Other 
airlines, notably charter carriers, have sought to adjust capacity and services to meet 
an anticipated cash flow. In practice, many have used a combination of measures 
with mixed success. This paper focuses on how TAP has responded to changing 
conditions by adjusting its supply-side activities in terms of restructuring its 
network to maximize potential revenues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade competition between airlines in Europe has been 
fierce. There have been important structural changes within the industry, and 
within the actors that participate in it. Some older companies such as Sabena 
and Swissair could not meet the challenges, while others such as Air France 
and KLM have sought some respite in merging. At the other extreme, several 
of the no-frill carriers such as easyJet and Ryanair have earned steady profits 
and subsumed some of their competitors. The changing networks of services 
being offered by air carriers in Europe has inevitable implications for spatial 
economic development and impacts on key industries such as tourism. Here 
we examine changes that have taken place in the network of TAP Air 
Portugal. 
TAP is medium sized European carrier with about 38 aircraft in its fleet 
and is entirely state owned.1 It is the primary airline in one of the European 
Union’s peripheral areas. It was for awhile a member of the now defunct 
Swissair led Qualiflyer Group alliance and it joined the Star Alliance in 
2004. Its financial situation is poor with large losses being experienced, 
although in 2003 it did make a marginal operating profit (€12 million on a 
turnover of €1144 million, but embedded in the accounts was a one-time 
gain of €20 million from the sale of shares in French Telecom and a write-
back for a tax court case in Brazil), the first in many years.2 Despite this, in 
2004 it sought a loan guarantee for €400 million from the Portuguese 
government. 
A major location problem is that its main hub, Lisbon Airport, is located 
on the western extreme of Europe, away from the main economic growth 
centre of European Union and thus unsuited to be a major strategic hub. 
Portugal is a long thin country that is not ideal for domestic hubbing. 
However, external to Europe, TAP does control over 50% of the air transport 
market between Europe and Brazil, and between Europe and Angola. This is 
the result of the exploitation of bilateral government agreements on these 
markets, and the legacy of Portugal’s colonial past. 
There are a plethora of business models that have been applied to the 
airline industry. The concern here is with the strategy that TAP has adopted 
to improve its market position at a time when many other carriers of 
comparable size have found survival difficult. Public ownership obviously 
helps, although the advantage is now diminished, but the concern here is 
                                                 
1  ICF/Button (2003) offers a categorization of European Union airlines.  
2  This is also after receiving $1,100 million in restructuring grants in 1994 
designed to allow the airline to become commercially viable. 
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with the structural changes that the company has made to reduce is long-
standing cash outflows.  
There is a basic problem encountered by firms in all industries that have 
committed costs (in this case a commitment to a scheduled service) and that 
has been recognized since the pioneering works of Edgeworth (1881), Coase 
(1946), Telser (1978), and others. In a fully competitive environment it is 
impossible to recover full costs in this situation of declining average cost. 
Full costs can only be recovered if either the concern receives a subsidy (and 
that, Coase correctly points out, is, irrespective of any distributional 
concerns, going to impose an excess efficiency burden elsewhere in the 
economy) or by somehow gaining a degree of market power and extracting 
economic rent from customers. TAP has in the past enjoyed state subsidies 
but these are no longer acceptable under EU legislation, and hence there has 
been the need for a re-examination of how costs may be recovered. 
THE MARKET SETTING 
The demonstration effects of the outcome of the U.S.’s 1978 Airline 
Deregulation Act experience stimulated changes elsewhere, although 
reforms in Europe tended to be more gradual, with a liberalized market 
within the European Economic Area akin to that of the U.S. domestic market 
only emerging in 1997. One reason for these more gradual changes was it 
mainly entailed reaching agreement on international air services between 
member states, rather than being an entirely internal matter as with the U.S. 
Countries such as France, Spain and Greece, where domestic aviation is 
relatively important, have a tradition of heavily regulating entry and fares, 
and this extended to their views of international aviation policy in Europe. 
There was also a pervasive philosophy that air transport serves public needs 
and that to ensure adequate provision and to avoid the economic distortions 
of monopoly power, state ownership best served the public interest. The 
problem was that these countries with well-entrenched systems of market 
controls, even if appreciative of the probable adverse implications of this for 
the overall welfare of the EU, still sought to cushion their airlines from 
competition.  
Reform of the European internal airline market materialized as a series 
of steps. Initially these were largely ad hoc measures brought about by 
judicial interpretations of EU laws, but a series of packages of reform 
followed (Button, 2004). The First Package in 1987 made the existing 
bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) more flexible. The Second Package 
passed in 1990, alleviated capacity sharing and market access, and largely 
removed governments’ role in setting airfares for international services 
within the EU. The Third Package, adopted in 1991, initiated a phased move 
that, by 1997, resulted in a regulatory framework similar to U.S. domestic 
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market. With the EU, it provided protection against national discrimination 
in airline licensing, eliminated capacity sharing, and allowed for a phased 
introduction of cabotage by 1997. 
More recently, the EU Commission has switched its attention to the 
relationship between EU air transport policy and EU external relations 
(Mencik von Zebinsky, 1996). The traditional right of governments to 
negotiate bilateral air service agreements with non-EU states has been 
brought into question. The EU Commission was given permission in 1996 to 
negotiate on behalf of all EU countries on soft issues regarding aviation.  
The growth of strategic alliances, and the adoption by many member states 
of the Open Skies bilateral ASA with the U.S., more recently led in 2003 to 
the EU Commission gaining approval to negotiate transatlantic agreements 
on behalf of the EU with the intent of ultimately creating a single U.S./EU 
air transport market. 
AIR CARRIERS’ REACTION AT THE EUROPEAN 
LIBERALISATION 
The outcome of all these reforms is that the competition faced by 
scheduled EU airlines has increased considerably. The latter stages of 
reforms also coincided with weak economic growth on the part of many 
European economies combined with exceptionally depressed air travel 
demand as the combined result of the September 2001 attacks on New York 
and Arlington, the Gulf conflict, and SARS. The emergence of no-frill 
carriers such as Ryanair at the lower end of the market have added to long 
standing competition from charter carriers, whilst in some markets there are 
now, generally subsidized, high-speed rail services. 
The schedule airlines thus face a major problem. They commit to a 
schedule and then attempt to raise enough revenue to cover the costs 
involved; there is a fixed cost to be recovered. In a monopoly situation this 
poses few problems, capacity is limited and premium fares can be charged to 
recover costs, to earn an economic rent, or to enjoy inefficiency. But as 
Coase and others have pointed out, if there is competition, then airlines will 
compete fares down to short-run marginal costs.3 They may all thus enjoy a 
high load factor, but not recover sufficient revenues to meet their long run 
financial outlays.4  
                                                 
3  Similar problems can also emerge if the market is contestable–—see 
Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982, for the conditions where this pertains. 
4  Indeed, whist virtually all the members of the Association of European 
Airlines were experiencing severe financial problems in 2003 their load fatctors had 
risen to an avearge of 73.4% from factors in the low 60% in the late 1990s when they 
were at least covering their opertating costs. 
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To overcome this, some airlines received subsidies, but EU regulations 
now largely prevent this. An alternative is to adopt measures within 
competition laws that allow for the creation of some degree of market power, 
even if it is only short term.5  
Non-pricing factors have been one way airlines have tried to create 
quasi-market power. This has included variations in in-flight and pre/post 
flight services, as well as scheduling and type of aircraft differentiation. 
More recently, there have been attempts, led by no-frill carriers, to unbundle 
services allowing customers to choose the portfolio of services they prefer. 
The difficulty is that ultimately Hotelling (1929) effects seem to exert 
themselves, with a trend towards meeting the preferences of the median 
passenger. 
The advent of computer reservation systems (CRS) and the growth of 
travel agents provided an initial advantage to individual airlines over both 
competitors and customers. This allowed segmentation markets and dynamic 
price discrimination systems in the form of yield management.6 Legal 
actions on both sides of the Atlantic, however, limited the ability of airlines 
to exploit this, and now technology changes, especially the World Wide 
Web, have weakened any CRS effect that may exist.7  
Retaining customer loyalty offers not only more revenue, but also a 
more predictable flow of revenue and the ability to adjust assets accordingly. 
Enhanced information systems allowed carriers to develop as part of their 
yield management strategy frequent flyer bonuses that went to their loyal 
customers. Frequent flyer loyalty has been dissipated, however, as it has 
become more difficult to reclaim miles—a fact one would anticipate from 
the basic premise that carriers seek to maximize payload at marginal cost. In 
some countries, such as Germany, frequent flier miles are also now taxed. 
Mergers, franchises, and alliances have occurred with the aim of 
offering a superior service through such things as code-shares, common 
frequent flyer programs, common airport lounges, and more coordinated 
scheduling. Sheer size is sometimes seen as an advantage because of the S-
curve effect—after a threshold is reached, the share of a market rises faster 
than an airline’s (or alliance’s) share of the capacity (Fruhan, 1972). The 
                                                 
5  Not all would agree that market power is needed but argue that there are 
gaming solutions (e.g., Levine, 2002) but this begs a number of questions and may 
ultimately revolve around how monopoly power is used rather than market power per 
se.  
6  If the objective of the company was to simply recover costs then Ramsey 
Pricing would be adopted, but airlines are profit-maximizing entities and will seek 
pricing strategies that maximize rent. 
7  It has also led to a very considerable decline in the number of travel agents 
in the U.S., although less so in Europe National Commission to Ensure Consumer 
Information and Choice in the Airline Industry (2002). 
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difficulty has been that airline companies vary considerably in their 
managerial styles and ethos, making it problematic to gain the full benefits 
of such unions.  
Some European carriers have benefited from operating in multiple 
markets. They enjoy a degree of quasi-monopoly power in some markets 
because potential existing competitors are reluctant to compete fearing 
retaliation in other markets where they were the incumbent dominant carrier 
(Edwards, 1955). This possibility has been reduced as no-frill carriers have 
emerged with no legacy services to protect and thus with nothing to lose 
from piece-meal route entry.8 
Vertical integration may also be used for cost recovery. The larger value 
chain reveals that while European airlines have been making large losses 
over the business cycle since liberalization, many upstream elements in the 
chain have not (Button, 2004). Airports, global distribution systems, airport 
services, airframe manufacturers, and others have consistently made 
relatively high returns. These upstream inputs operate in much less 
competitive conditions than the airlines. Attempts by airlines at capturing 
some of this upstream rent are increasing. In the U.S., airlines have 
combined to create Orbitz to compete with the four large global distribution 
systems, and Opodo is gradually growing as a European counterpart. 
Companies like Ryanair in the EU have sought to extract some of the 
economic rent enjoyed by airports. 
There can also be other changes on the supply-side and airlines’ route 
networks can also be used to extract rent for full cost recovery. The initial 
successes in the U.S. came when airlines adopted hub-and-spoke systems 
(Oum & Tretheway, 1990) that generated network economies of scope and 
density on the cost side and economies of market presence on the revenue 
side (Levine, 1987). A structure similar to the hub-and-spoke system existed 
in Europe prior to liberalization with bilateral ASAs restricting routes to the 
flag carrier of each country, and services to their main airport. Radial 
networks were thus common, but airlines were unable to fully exploit their 
potential benefits because of a lack of fare and capacity setting freedoms, 
and the frequent requirement to revenue pool. Post deregulation has seen 
only small changes, mainly because congestion limits flexibility. 
Airlines, when confronted with losses, are also forced to look at their 
cost structures. While it may be correct that, in a highly competitive 
environment, falling average costs result in an inability to recover costs, the 
situation is exacerbated if costs are not being minimized. European airlines 
have seen the emergence of no-frill carriers that have removed some costs 
from their operations and significantly reduced others. The traditional 
                                                 
8  Dresner (2004) offers conformation of this theory in the context of the U.S. 
domestic airline market. 
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carriers have followed this example. In the end, however, if there is truly a 
decreasing costs issue then relative costs will only determine which carriers 
remain in the market, rather than the overall viability of the market.9 
While the general pattern of events following the deregulation of air 
transport in Europe has been studied, and no-frill carriers have attracted 
some interest,10 analysis of individual European scheduled carriers is scant 
and what has been done has tended to look at those that failed to survive in 
the new competitive conditions (e.g., Suen, 2002). Equally, changes in 
network structures have only received limited attention. 
TAP AIR PORTUGAL 
TAP Air Portugal was founded in 1945 by the Portuguese government 
and was regarded as the extension of Portugal abroad and as a way to get 
closer of the rest of the Portuguese Empire. The first commercial European 
route was established in September 1946 and the first non-European route to 
Luanda in December. Seven years later TAP was privatized. Meanwhile the 
number of destinations increased without any defined overall strategy. The 
first route to Brazil was inaugurated in 1961, and 10 years later the first route 
to North America (Montreal.). In 1974 came the Portuguese revolution that 
ended several decades of dictatorship. A program of nationalization that 
included TAP Air Portugal in 1975 followed this.  
The Portuguese government has recently sought to privatize TAP but a 
proposed purchase of 34% of the company in 2001 by Swissair fell through 
when the latter went bankrupt. A firmer legal commitment to gradually 
privatize was legislated in 2002, and a more modest proposal to sell 51% of 
its handling division emerged in 2003. This initially entailed the 
establishment of a new company—Serviços Portugueses de Handling 
(SPdH)—which began operations in October 2003 with the short term intent 
that TAP would retain a 94% stake and the private PGA-Portugália Airlines 
have 6%. TAP itself remains a publicly owned airline. 
TAP is a small to medium sized carrier, with a fleet in 2004 of 38 
airplanes.11 It is a mixed carrier providing European and intercontinental 
services. It is essentially a carrier that focuses its attention on meeting the 
                                                 
9  As the American economist Frank Knight (1921) once said, “Costs merely 
register competing attractions.” 
10  For example there is a widely held view that no-frill carriers have been a 
universal success. In fact only Southwest in the U.S. and Ryanair in Europe have 
consistently made profits, and both enjoyed first-mover advantage. A significant 
nuber of no-frill carriers on both sides of the Atlantic have surcome to commercial 
pressures. 
11  In terms of passengers, carried TAP ranked 13th amongst Association of 
European Airlines members and 12th by passenger kilometers. 
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demands of its regional market although this region extends geographically 
well beyond the boundaries of Portugal, although not throughout Europe 
(ICF & Button, 2003). TAP offers a more limited geographical coverage 
than the large global carriers such as British Airways or Lufthansa, although 
it does serve a range of major airports.12 The carrier has a significant 
intercontinental coverage, but because of the bilateral ASA structure, and the 
large-scale movements of Portuguese nationals to specific markets, it focuses 
on intercontinental services to Brazil and Angola. Table 1 offers some 
current comparisons with a sample of the other legacy carriers in Europe. 
Table 1. Number of passengers, passenger kilometeres and available seat kilometers of 
selected EU carriers, 2003 
 
 
Airline               Passengers Passenger kilometeres Available seat kilometers 
                          (thousand) (million) (million) 
 
Air France            43490.3 99073.8 131647.6 
Alitalia                 22244.7 31254.2 43564.5 
Austriamn              6895.1 14537.5 20386.6 
British Airways    34815.4 100425.7 137843.3 
Finnair                    5672.3 8653.3 13815.2 
Iberia                    24669.8 41957.6 55926.2
KLM                    18719.2 56540.6 72409.6 
Lufthansa             44463.3 96616.8 124166.0 
Olympic                 5105.1 6083.6 9720.3 
SAS                      20456.5 23020.3 33332.7
TAP                        5633.7 12011.5 16836.5 
 
Source: Association of European Airlines. (2004). Yearbook  2004. Brussels.  
 
 
Normally carriers like TAP are either alliance members to gain the 
advantages of scope, density, and market coverage that this brings, or have a 
range of code-share agreements on a route basis with other carriers. 
Although TAP was involved in the European Qualiflyer alliance and has 
now joined the Star Alliance, more recently it pursued the path of multiple 
code shares with second tier carriers (e.g., with bmi, Finnair, Iberia, 
Olympic, and SN Brussels). However, because of its focus on particular 
regions (both intra-Europe and intercontinental), there tends to be limited 
network-based competition in many of its intercontinental markets. Indeed, 
TAP is a near monopolist European carrier for many of its Brazilian 
                                                 
12  In 2003 TAP served 36 destinations, 7 in Portugal, 15 in the rest of Europe, 
and 14 beyond Europe. As a benchmark, British Airways serves 153 destinations 
with 76 beyond Europe. 
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destinations (which comprise 33 flights a week and contribute about 20% of 
its revenue). There is much tougher competition on busier continental 
(although this is to some extent constrained by code-share agreements), and 
some denser intercontinental routes.  
TAP has not traditionally been a highly efficient airline. For example, 
looking at the total factor productivity of 41 airlines from around the world 
in 1983, Windle (1991) found that TAP came 38th (and 12th of the 14 
European carriers included). In terms of unit costs measure it came 29th.  
Analysis of 1992-1995 data by Ng and Seabright (2001) shows that whilst 
the carrier had the third lowest cost for cockpit crew and fifth lowest for 
cabin crew of the 12 EU carriers studied, its labour productivity in terms of 
million revenue passenger kilometres per employee was the second lowest, 
and less than half of that of U.S. carriers which overall outperformed the 
European airlines.  
The recent performance of the carrier has seen a steady rise in patronage 
(from just over 3 million passengers in 1990 to nearly 5.5 million in 2002). 
Parallel growth in available seat kilometres in the 1990s led to a fairly static 
load factor of around 60%. As deregulation has allowed greater fare 
flexibility and enhanced competition stimulated lower prices, load factors 
have risen since 2002 to something over 70% (compared to 73.4% for 
Association of European Airlines carriers as a whole in 2003). In terms of 
financial results (Figure 1), however, TAP has not done well, although there 
is some indication of improvement in the last few years.  
The interest here is the extent to which TAP has sought to recover more 
of its costs, and also contain those costs, through manipulation of its route 
network. This network comprises unregulated intra-European Economic 
Area routes and ASA regulated intercontinental services. This manipulation 
offers the potential for the exploitation of economies of density and scope 
whilst extracting additional consumer surplus from the monopoly elements 
of the network. An element of fixed cost recovery is thus theoretically 
possible. 
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Figure 1. TAP net financial results, 1995-2003 
Source: Data was compiled from TAP Annual Reports, 1995-2003.  
 
TAP AIR PORTUGAL’S NETWORK 
With significant governmental protection, little competition and 
guaranteed coverage of financial losses, the nationalized TAP Air Portugal 
had not traditionally been excessively worried about its efficiency. Its labour 
productivity, and productivity in general, was low even compared to other 
state owned European flag carriers. Some of the difficulties were simply due 
to poor internal management, but one of the problems was route structure. 
After 45 years, the network of TAP (see Figures 2a to 2d) represented a 
piece-meal of routes without any clear perspective or orientation. A decade 
or so ago, there was limited evidence of flight concentrations in a hub-and-
spoke structure as we now understand it. Moreover, non-European routes 
often involved stopovers, or some very circuitous routings, that reduced cost 
efficiency and the attractiveness of the services to potential users. The 
European network involved duplication of several services and in some cases 
there was a triplication of flights to the same destination from several 
Portuguese airports. No Portuguese airport had a clearly dominant role as a 
hub.  
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Figure 2a. TAP European network in 1990 
 
Figure 2b. TAP South American network in 1990 
 
Figure 2c. TAP North American network in 1990 
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Figure 2d. TAP African network in 1990 
 
However, with the onset of European Union liberalisation process in 
mid-1990s, combined with the beginning of the downturn in the world 
economic situation, and especially the European situation,  from the late 
1990s, TAP began to make very significant loses that clearly required some 
form of major structural adjustment. The government’s restructuring grant 
offered some prospect for change, but was largely used to cover short-term 
deficits and to expand the already gangly route network. In 1997 the 
company was still operating with a mixed fleet of Boeing, Airbus, and 
Lockheed aircraft and thus forgoing the economics of synergy that 
accompany fleet standardization. Demand was down, and was unlikely even 
in an economic upturn to be as vibrant as in the mid-1990s. And there was 
new competition to face in Europe—by 2000 the no-frill carriers were 
supplying 600,000 seats a year, up from virtually zero five years before, and 
the trend was irrepressibly upwards. The low cost, no-frill carriers although 
still predominantly focusing on UK rooted services were expanding their 
networks across Europe. 
The European TAP service network that existed in 2000 (see Figures 3a 
to 3d) had changed little over the unstructured form of a decade earlier. 
Elsewhere, TAP had made some changes. The rather volatile South 
American routes had seen a notable expansion of services, the African 
network had been increasingly concentration on flights from Lisbon Airport, 
and the longest haul North American routes had been abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the networks continued to involve numerous stopovers, 
routings were often circular, and there remained duplication of flights from 
different Portuguese cities. 
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Figure 3a. TAP European network in 2000 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. TAP South American network in 2000 
 
 
Figure  3c. TAP North American network in 2000 
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Figure 3d. TAP African network in 2000 
 
 
In the face of this, and with the reality of EU rules now preventing 
further explicit government subsidies, the concept of the flag carrier was 
effectively passé. TAP was forced to radically rethink its philosophy.13 
Management soon understood that the airline was unable to compete head-on 
with the major European carriers such as British Airways, Lufthansa, and 
Air France, because it simply did not enjoy the massive economies of scale 
and scope they did, nor did TAP have the domestic feeder traffic. Its fleet 
was also unsuitable to this task. Portugal is also located on the periphery of 
the EU, far way from the largest markets and the most vibrant economies. 
Establishing even a medium size, stand-alone hub in these conditions is not 
viable.  
Thus, TAP had to find alternative solutions. Portugal has tended to 
enjoy good relationships with several former colonies such as Brazil and 
those in Africa. The bilateral ASA agreements, coupled with the problems 
that airlines of these countries encountered, effectively gave TAP substantial 
de facto monopoly power in these intercontinental markets. Many of the 
routes involved were also unattractive to the larger European airlines 
because they did not fit conveniently in their network structures and their 
domestic feed was limited. Long-haul routes also have the advantage that 
demand tends to be less fare elastic (Gillen, Morrison & Stewart, 2002) and 
                                                 
13  The rethink coincided with the appointment of a Brazilian as chief 
executive officer, Fernando Pinto, that effectively removed the airline from 
traditional Portuguses political ties and moved it towards commercial management. 
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they tend to attract a larger number of business class fare paying passengers 
(Button, 2004).14 
In 2001 (see Figures 4a to 4d) only small changes to the TAP route 
service structure of a decade earlier were visible, but by 2002 (see Figures 5a 
to 5d) significant changes were beginning to emerge. The total number of 
routes offered, together with the number of destinations served, was 
beginning to fall with indirect and longer routings all but eliminated and 
replaced by direct ones. Moreover, there was a clear concentration of 
services on a Lisbon hub and with this came an elimination of duplicated 
long-haul flights. For example, Porto lost a number of services. These 
changes, combined with a modest macroeconomic upturn in several of the 
countries served by TAP, and a range of internal cost cutting measures, 
brought about a modesty upturn in the company’s financial performance. 
Figure 4a. TAP European network in 2001 
 
                                                 
14  Even in cases where there are no restrictive bilateral ASAs the traditional 
carriers tend to face less threat of competition from low cost carriers partly because it 
is more difficult to enjoy the high crew and aircraft utilization rates that no-frill 
airlines seek. This is not to say that low cost operations are absent from deregulated 
long-haul routes, indeed Laker Airways in the late 1970s may be seen as a pioneering 
venture in low cost airlines. 
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Figure 4b. TAP South American network in 2001 
 
Figure 4c. TAP North American network in 2001 
 
Figure 4d. TAP African network in 2001 
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Figure 5a. TAP European network in 2002 
 
Figure 5b. TAP South American network in 2002 
 
Figure 5c. TAP North American network in 2002 
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Figure 5d. TAP African network in 2002 
 
The current TAP route service network (see Figures 6a to 6d) is similar 
to that of 2002. Lisbon Airport is the major hub in the system with a network 
of European flights (including code shares that are not shown) feeding a 
range of intercontinental destinations in South American and Africa. At the 
non-European end of routes, it has began domestic services in Mozambique 
to feed its long-haul routes and in 2005 plans to relocate its Africa hub to 
Angola—it is currently in Johannesburg. The European network has 
remained dramatically simplified even as some European economies have 
begun to recover. Costs have also been contained as the airline has moved to 
standardize its fleet on Airbuses (its last Boeing leaving service in 2002) and 
to reduce its labour force. 
Figure 6a. TAP European network in 2004 
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Figure 6b. TAP South American network in 2004 
 
Figure 6c. TAP North American network in 2004 
 
Figure 6d. TAP African network in 2004 
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The relative concentration on direct services has been pushed furthest in 
its long-haul markets as can be seen in Figure 7. Basically, TAP changed the 
structure of its network over a 4-year time span to focus on what it considers 
to be its profit centres, where it enjoys a degree of monopoly power, and to 
provide feeder traffic to those centres. Joining the Star Alliance offers the 
other members of the group complimentary services to South America and 
Africa and Portuguese feed to their own service networks.  
Figure 7. The evolution of the TAP Air Portugal network 
Source: Data was compiled from TAP Annual Reports, 1990-2004. 
It provides the potential for TAP to feed more traffic from a number of 
European catchments areas into its South Atlantic and African routes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The new institutional environment in the EU has brought about 
significant changes in the conditions confronting the management of the 
region’s scheduled airlines. Although the change has been phased-in, unlike 
that which affected U.S. domestic carriers in the late 1970s, the reaction of 
many of the incumbent flag carriers has often been slow. Inertia has been the 
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common feature and restructuring has generally been slow and reactive to 
crises rather than representing a proactive management philosophy. In part 
this can be explained by the reluctance of some governments to appreciate 
that a European Single Market entails just that; it means competition, 
commercialization, and free entry. Those entrenched in the airline industry, 
both on the management and labour sides, have often lacked vision about 
what the new conditions entail, and it has been left to newcomers such as 
Ryanair and easyJet to meet the demands of customers.  
The incumbent EU airlines’ initial response to the rigors of the market 
was to emulate their U.S. counterparts that had experienced two decades of 
competition. Sophisticated yield management regimes were introduced, 
frequent flyer programs were initiated, existing hub-and-spoke networks 
were further developed, and alliances were joined. As with their U.S. 
cousins, however, these measures have not protected all from heavy financial 
losses and, in some cases, bankruptcy. The importance of network 
configurations, however, has tended to be overlooked in the literature in this 
field, but is beginning to be appreciated on both sides of the Atlantic. In 
Europe, British Airways, for example, has moved towards a focus on long 
haul activities, and the chairmen of both Delta and United have stated their 
intent to do the same. These airlines, however, have the advantage of scale 
and a tradition of commercial management to define their strategies; other 
carriers often have neither. 
TAP has had the particular handicap of 100% state ownership, relatively 
small size, and a disadvantageous, peripheral-market location. It has thus 
experienced serious financial problems. Coase’s (1946) arguments, in 
particular on cost recovery in a decreasing average cost, competitive industry 
now seem difficult to refute in the context of TAP. The only way full costs 
are likely to be recovered in these circumstances is through ad hoc efforts to 
minimize fixed costs and to seek some market advantage, however short-
lived, wherever possible. The examination of TAP Air Portugal’s 
manipulation of its route structure provides some insights into the way one 
carrier seems to have bought itself some breathing time. It has focused its 
energies on longer haul routes where demand tends to be less elastic and 
competition from no-frill carriers is likely to be less intense.  The beautiful 
thing about markets, however, is that they are never still. Whether the TAP 
route restructuring offers a one-year respite or one of longer duration is not 
clear (and, indeed, should not be clear in a market) but certainly, as past 
experience has shown, good management should already be looking for new 
strategies now that it is within the Star Alliance to cope with the next crisis. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the effects of airline alliances on the allied partners’ output by 
comparing the traffic change observed between the pre- and the post-alliance 
period. First, a simple methodology based on traffic passenger modelling is 
developed, and then an empirical analysis is conducted using time series from four 
global strategic alliances (Wings, Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam) and 124 
alliance routes. The analysis concludes that, all other things being equal, strategic 
alliances do lead to a 9.4%, on average, improvement in passenger volume. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last years, strategic alliances have become extremely popular 
among airlines since major and smaller carriers have increasingly sought to 
extend their service network through alliance schemes in order to build 
global network and, therefore, to attract more passengers. It seems that 
strategic alliances enable the carriers involved to expand, without investing 
new resources, the reach of their network and services to many parts of the 
world where it may be not be economical for stand-alone carriers to operate 
on their own and/or where they are not authorized to operate because of 
regulatory constraints. 
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This paper examines the effects of airline alliances on the allied 
partners’ output by comparing the traffic change observed on alliance routes 
between the pre- and the post-alliance period. It focuses exclusively on a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of alliances on passenger traffic, trying 
not only to determine whether there is indeed any impact on traffic as a 
result of alliances but also to quantify it. In this sense, its seeks to confirm 
the results of previous empirical and theoretical studies, whose findings 
indicate that alliances do lead to a significant increase in passenger traffic.  
A two-step approach is used. In the first step, a specific methodology of 
determining and measuring the impact of alliances is developed. This 
methodology is mainly inspired by that used by Iatrou (2004) and Bissessur 
(1996). It is based on a passenger traffic model which relates passenger 
traffic to a limited set of exogenous variables: (a) the per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) expressed in real terms as an index of 
income/economic activity and (b) a capacity index (available seats), 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and fares. The second step consists first 
of the econometric estimation of the above regression model using time 
series data, and then of the isolation and quantification of the alliance 
impact. This latter is derived from the comparison of the traffic variation 
induced by non-alliance factors (real GDP) with the observed traffic 
variation during the post-alliance period.  
The work contains significant innovative elements both in relation to the 
time period examined and to the sample of routes-airlines studied. Not only 
does the evaluation study extend to the 1990s covering the period 1982-2001 
so as to include even the most recent years, but it also covers 124 alliance 
routes served by the four global strategic alliances actually in force at the 
time of the study (Wings, Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam). 
Furthermore, it does not concentrate exclusively on North Atlantic flights, on 
hub-hub routes, nor on major airlines, as most previous studies on traffic 
have done. At the same time, a more innovative and functional definition of 
the alliance date formation is proposed in order to correctly assess the 
alliance impact on passenger traffic. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The available empirical studies that have attempted to identify and 
evaluate the potential impact of alliances on traffic volume (and load factor) 
are quite limited in scope and most of them have been carried out recently. 
In their majority, they conclude that there is indeed a positive impact as far 
as alliance routes and complementary alliances are concerned, confirming 
the theoretical predictions of previous works (Brueckner, 2001; Oum, Park 
& Zhang, 2000; Park, 1997; Park & Zhang, 1998).  
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A brief overview of previous empirical works is presented below giving 
emphasis to their qualitative conclusions. 
Improvement in connecting services and flight frequencies, which can 
generate increased traffic without having to expand networks, are among the 
major benefits airline alliances can bring to passengers. More particularly, 
Youssef and Hansen (1994) found in the particular case of the Swissair/SAS 
alliance a rise both in quantity and quality of Swissair/SAS connecting 
services, with the change in quantity of services being derived from an 
increase in the number of flights between the two carriers hubs, while the 
improved quality was brought about by both flight increases and better 
coordination under the alliance. In a search that attempts to measure the 
effect of alliances on passengers’ schedule delay of three transatlantic 
alliances (KLM/Northwest Airlines, Lufthansa/United Airlines and Delta Air 
Lines/Swissair/Sabena), Oum, Park and Zhang (2000) suggest that 
complementary alliances (where partners have non-overlapping routes) 
enable partners to offer higher flight frequency to those passengers who fly 
beyond non-stop city-pair routes, as well as to the majority of connecting 
passengers. Parallel alliance partners (where partners have overlapping 
routes) are also expected to increase flight frequencies.  
While there is some evidence of increases in flight frequencies and 
market share resulting from alliance agreements, this does not automatically 
mean that there are more users, that is, more passengers.  However, these 
rather limited in scope studies tend to conclude that alliances do impact 
positively on passenger traffic especially as far as complementary alliance 
routes are concerned.  
Gellman Research Associates (1994), in a study/research conducted at 
the request of the U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT), measured 
the impact of the codesharing agreements between British Airways/USAir 
and KLM/Northwest Airlines on market share and welfare. In this study, 
they measured, using U.S. Origin and Destination Survey ticket sample data 
for the first quarter 1994 and flight alternatives, the market share effect by 
relating the estimation over a sample of city-pair markets of a discrete choice 
econometric model. This model relates market share to the attributes that 
characterizes the flights offered (such as fare, overall trip time, service 
quality, code share, online versus interline service, etc.). The results indicate 
significant impact across the KLM/Northwest Airlines and the British 
Airways/USAir code share markets in the sample: lower market share by 
8.0% points for the former and 11.2% points for the latter under the 
counterfactual scenario (no code share).  
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1995) concluded, mainly 
based on interviews with representatives from governments and airlines, that 
strategic alliances between U.S and foreign airlines, which involve code 
share on a vast number of routes so as to strategically link airlines’ flight 
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networks, have generated large gains for the participating carriers in terms of 
passengers and revenues. U.S. GAO indicated that British Airways/USAir, 
KLM/Northwest Airlines, and Lufthansa/United Airlines have increased 
their annual traffic on their alliance routes as a result of the formation of 
those alliances and that these gains can be attributed to: (a) code sharing and 
block-space sales agreements on numerous alliance routes covering a wide 
geographical area the alliance routes and (b) a high degree of operating and 
marketing integration.  
There is also evidence that traffic gains can occur whether airlines re-
align their strategies or not. Dresner, Flicop and Windle (1995) studied the 
outcome of three equity alliances (1988-Continental Airlines/SAS, 1989-
Delta Air Lines/Swissair and 1989-KLM/Northwest Airlines) in order to see 
whether they have led to changes in airline route structure or not and to 
determine whether they have been successful in generating traffic or 
increasing market share on international routes. Using before and after 
alliance data for the years 1987-1991, the analysis indicated that in only one 
out of three agreement cases have the airlines increased their transatlantic 
traffic volume and increased their load factors after realigning their route 
systems to take advantage of the alliance. More precisely, it showed that 
although both KLM/Northwest Airlines and Continental Airlines/SAS 
followed re-aligning strategies, only the former achieved some successes in 
terms of traffic increase. On the contrary, Delta Air Lines/Swissair managed 
to increase their traffic and load factors despite not having re-aligned their 
route structure strategies. Whether these results can be generalised is 
uncertain because the study was limited only to equity alliances on the 
transatlantic routes. The overall conclusion was that alliances do not appear 
to guarantee success in the very competitive North Atlantic environment. 
In his attempt to evaluate alliances’ impact on passenger traffic, 
Bissessur (1996) estimated a traffic model over the 1982-1992 period with 
data for 52 inter-hub routes and from six major alliances (European Quality 
Alliance, Global Excellence, British Airways/USAir, KLM/Northwest 
Airlines, Continental Airlines/SAS and Iberia/Aerolineas Argentinas/Viasa). 
By comparing the traffic change induced by non-alliance factors (real GDP) 
with the actual level of traffic change between the pre- and post-alliance 
periods, he showed that major alliances lead to traffic increases on hub-hub 
routes with the exception of two routes (Copenhangen-Zurich and Vienna-
Geneva). A further cross-section indicated that the main factors behind the 
alliances’ operational success are: (a) the partners’ network size and the 
compatibility of these networks, (b) the frequency of service between the 
hubs of the partners, (c) the flight connection time at the hub,  and (d) the 
level of competition on their networks.1 
                                                 
1 See also Bissessur and Alamdari (1998).  
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Park and Zhang (1998) and Oum, Park and Zhang (2000) looked at the 
effects of an airline alliance on partner airlines’ outputs by comparing traffic 
changes on alliance routes with those on non-alliance routes for the period 
1992-1994. Using panel data of the four major alliances (British 
Airways/USAir, Delta Air Lines/Swissair/Sabena, KLM/Northwest Airlines 
and Lufthansa/United Airlines) operating non-stop routes on North Atlantic 
markets (19 alliance and 36 non-alliance routes) for the 1992-1994 period, 
they found that most of the partners have recorded greater traffic increases 
on their alliance routes than on their non-alliance routes. More specifically, 
the alliance routes of the eight airlines studied showed traffic increases 
ranging between 6.8% and 66.8% whereas non-alliance routes showed traffic 
decreases of as much as 3.2% and increases of up to 9.1%. 
Oum, Park and Zhang (2000) sought to empirically investigate the 
effects of alliances on air fares, passenger volume, and consumer surplus by 
studying four major alliances operating on the transatlantic markets for the 
period 1990-1994. By estimating a system of demand and price equations 
using a database consisting of seventeen transatlantic alliance routes, they 
concluded, by comparing pre- and post-alliance outcomes, that the British 
Airways/USAir, KLM/Northwest Airlines and Lufthansa/United Airlines 
alliances, which can be considered as complementary alliances, increased 
aggregate demand on their alliance routes during the post-alliance period, 
while the Delta Air Lines/Swissair/Sabena, which can be viewed as a parallel 
alliance, decreased aggregate demand on their alliance routes during the 
post-alliance period. In a separate analysis studying the effect of alliances on 
the partners’, the non-partners’ and total traffic, they found that: (a) 
complementary alliances increase total output by an average of 11-17%, 
while parallel alliances decrease total output by an average of 11-15% and 
(b) the results for the non-partners’ traffic are consistent with their 
theoretical predictions, which indicate that complementary alliance adversely 
affect non-partners’ output. 
Finally, Iatrou (2004) and Iatrou and Alamdari (2003) showed, through 
a series of interviews and questionnaires with the executives of the alliance 
department of  airlines participating in the four global strategic alliances 
(Wings, Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam), that alliances have indeed 
produced the expected positive impact in terms of traffic. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The methodology used in order to measure the alliance impact relies on 
a time series estimation of a traffic regression model. It is mainly based on 
the comparison of traffic variation induced by non-alliance factors, that is, 
per capita GDP in constant prices (RGDPPC), with the observed traffic 
variation during the post-alliance period. 
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Modelling the Airline Alliance Impact on Traffic 
A simple way, but not an exhaustive one, to model traffic demand is to 
relate passenger traffic positively to real economic activity—as this is 
reflected by the per capita GDP in constant prices (RGDPPC)—and capacity 
(CAP) as a proxy of airline frequency, HHI for route specific competition 
and negatively to real fares (RY).2 
Thus, the following multiplicative traffic model3 results: 
 
PASSijt = A RGDPPCjt b CAPijt c RYijt d 10(eHHIjt fD)                    (1)                                   
 
where PASSijt = Passenger Traffic for the airline pair i, route j 
and year t,  
RGDPPCjt = Real GDP per capita of the origin country for 
 the route j and year t expressed in local currency, 
CAPijt = Capacity for the airline pair i, route j and year t, 
RYijt = Real yield for pair i, route j and year t. As a proxy 
of real yield, the world nominal yield—in United States 
Dollar (USD)—converted into local currency and deflated 
by national inflation rate is chosen, while local and 
national refer to the origin country. The world passenger 
revenue per passenger kilometre, in USD, is used as a 
measure of nominal yield,4 
HHIjt = Route specific competition for route j and year t, 
and 
D = A dummy variable which takes value one for the years 
1980-81 (Second oil shock), 1991 (Gulf war) and 2001 
(terrorist attacks on September 11) and value zero in all the 
other years; 
                                                 
2 Of course, traffic for any given route tends to arise from the complex interaction of a much larger set of factors that 
affect the different market segments differentially. Two main categories of factors can be distinguished (Doganis, 
2002). The first one includes those factors affecting all markets (level of personal disposable income, supply 
conditions, convenience of air travel, level of economic activity/trade, population size and growth rate, social 
environment, attitudes to travel, etc.). The second one includes the factors that affect only particular routes but may be 
totally absent on others (level of tourist attraction, exchange rate fluctuations, travel restrictions, historical/cultural 
links, earlier population movements, current labour flows, nature of economic activity, etc.).  
3 A major disadvantage of using load factor when measuring the alliance impact is that the alliance impact is highly 
affected by service frequency. Any alliance is usually accompanied by an increase in service frequency, as the partners 
attempt to integrate their networks and gain market share, which in turn will affect negatively load factors given that 
traffic is likely to respond only gradually to any increasing  frequencies.   
4 It is acknowledged that the use of a global measure of nominal yield could lead to a mis-estimation of the price 
variable impact and thus  increase the chances of finding a non-significant price impact.   
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which may alternatively be expressed as:  
 
LogPASSijt =  
a + b LogRGDPPCjt + c LogCAPijt + d LogRYijt + e HHIjt + f D         (2) 
 
where Log(  ): log to the base 10, 
a = LogA, 
b, c and e > 0, 
d < 0. 
 
Disposable income 
Any development in personal income affects the level of the purchasing 
power and the propensity to undertake leisure travel in general and air travel 
more specifically. As income increases two things take place: First, a greater 
part of the disposable income is spent on non-necessary consumer goods 
including air travel. Second, air travel, which constitutes a more expensive 
but also a more convenient means of transport for longer distances, becomes 
more accessible and more competitive (Lansing & Blood, 1984). Therefore, 
greater income results in an increase of expenditure on leisure traveling, but 
also in air transport being favoured over other competitive and alternative 
means of transport, especially for longer destinations. Taking into account 
that data concerning disposable income are not always available and that the 
way of measuring it differs from country to country, the use of GDP as a 
proxy measure is considered as essential.  
The use of GDP is considered as the most appropriate measure for at 
least two more reasons.5 First, it does constitute a measure index of national 
income and wealth and is included among the major determinants of leisure 
travel. As real GDP increases, people tend to have more income to consume 
(Kanafani, 1983) and at the same time the improvement of living standards 
leads to changes of consumer habits. These changes favour certain categories 
of goods and services, such as leisure activities, including travelling, which 
present high demand/revenue elasticities. Second, it does constitute a 
measure index of business activity and therefore wealth, and is included 
among the major determinants of business traveling.6  
Any increase in population also leads to an increase in passenger traffic 
with the exception of the less developed countries, for which this relation 
                                                 
5 The choice of per capita GDP as an approximation of personal disposable income does entails certain risks and 
restrictions as it assumes a homogeneous allocation of income among all classes and citizens.  
6 The demand for business travel is not directly related to the disposable income of the business travelers themselves 
but to the needs of the businesses they work for. These needs are however directly related to the economic activity, 
and thus to national income and wealth.  
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does not apply in most cases, if at all; for the simple reason that a large part 
of the population simply cannot afford air travel. 
RGDPPC as an explanatory variable presents many advantages, given 
that it is a composite variable that combines real GDP and population, two 
important explicative determinants of passenger traffic, as mentioned above, 
while it permits the avoidance of a third one, that of exports. Furthermore, it 
can be considered as a variable totally independent of the alliance formation.  
 
Capacity  
 The use of seat kilometre available as an index measure of capacity 
and proxy of frequency entails a positive impact on passenger traffic for two 
reasons. First, any increase of available seats for any given level of demand 
can lead to higher supply and to fares’ decrease, which can boost passenger 
traffic. Second, any increase in frequency can lead to the improvement of 
service quantity, which in its turn enables airlines/alliances to attract more 
passengers and convince them to use airplanes over any alternative and 
competitive means of transport, especially in relation to short haul and 
domestic flights, always provided of course that air fares remain affordable. 
Increased service frequency can also stimulate traffic as more flights are 
offered at convenient times.7 At the level of specific airlines or routes, there 
is certainly an additional argument that renders frequency/capacity a 
significant parameter: increases in service frequency can increase the market 
share of an airline in relation to that of its competitors; this principle has 
been conceptualised in the generally accepted S-curve variation of market 
share with frequency (Taneja, 1981). 
 In a way, CAP can be considered as an index of the improvement of 
the quantity of service and, contrary to RGDPPC, it can be indeed 
                                                 
7 An implicit assumption of the traffic regression model is that the cause-and-effect relationship, if any, between 
traffic and frequency/capacity is unidirectional: The explanatory variables are the cause and the dependent variable is 
the effect. It seems however, that in the particular case of traffic and capacity, such a one-way cause-and-effect 
relationship is not meaningful. This occurs because traffic is determined by frequency/capacity, and 
frequency/capacity is, in its turn, partly determined by traffic. As a matter of fact, higher frequency/capacity can 
stimulate traffic, but at the same time, a rising demand resulting from an increase in GDP can lead to an increase in 
frequency/capacity to accommodate the higher number of passengers, which makes the relationship a two-directional 
one.  In short, this simultaneous relationship renders any distinction between dependent and explanatory variables 
dubious, and the least-squares estimators are, in this case, not only biased but also inconsistent since the endogenous 
explanatory variables become stochastic as they are correlated with the disturbance term of equation in which it 
appears as an explanatory variable (Gujarati, 1995). In order to overcome the problem of the simultaneous-equation 
bias, one could proceed to the estimation of a simultaneous two equations model, one for each of the jointly dependent 
variables, but first, it is necessary first to test the hypothesis of the mutual dependency using, for example, the pair 
wise Granger causality test (Granger, 1969). 
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considered as an alliance factor since the formation of the airline alliance can 
change dramatically the frequency of service (Youssef, 1992). 
 
Fares 
Apart from income and capacity, price is another variable that might 
have a major impact on air travel demand. Obviously, air travel prices are 
expected to have a negative impact, since price and demand usually move in 
opposite directions. If a fare goes up, demand is expected to fall, and vice 
versa. Given that low fares, or a limited change of fares, are likely to 
stimulate demand particularly in the leisure market,8 it is necessary to 
include them in the regression model. Moreover, it would be illogical not to 
ascribe some part of the dynamic development of passenger traffic observed 
in recent years to the moderate evolution of nominal fares (Iatrou, 2004). 
Previous studies on the issue of traffic have made use of airline yield as 
a good approximation of fare levels (Bissesur 1996; Morrison & Winston 
1990). Airline yield indicates the passenger revenue per passenger-kilometre, 
that is, the ratio revenue to passenger-kilometres.  
The choice of yield instead of fares is due to the various problems that 
have arisen from the use of ABC World Airways Guides that constitute the 
most official and sole information source of fares. First, available data are 
not very reliable in that they do not give the actual fares being paid. Indeed, 
owing to various unofficial discounts, the fares paid by consumers differ, 
often widely, from the published fares. In addition, the fare data are very 
complex with many different fare classes. Another restriction associated with 
the use of fares is that the available guides do not list fares for all 
destinations. The only fares that are consistently listed are those between the 
major hubs. On the whole, what characterizes all routes is the virtual non-
availability of data for fares, their relative unreliability, which resulted in a 
difficult data processing to obtain the required complete and consistent time 
series. For this reason, it was decided that fares should not used as a variable 
measuring air travel demand, and yield is used instead.  
In any case, it becomes obvious that yield has to be adjusted for price 
inflation so as to establish the real cost of air travel in relation to other goods 
or services and hence to correctly assess the role of air travel prices.  
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
Competition is a key factor of traffic growth and is expected to influence 
it negatively. In order to take into account the competition impact the well-
                                                 
8 Of course, fares are not expected to influence business and leisure travel in a uniform way. Since business travellers 
do not pay for their own travel, their demand would be relatively insensitive to fare changes and their price elasticities 
would be lower than those of leisure travellers. An examination of price elasticities in some studies shows this to be 
true (Straszheim, 1969). 
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know Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), is used. The HHI is used to 
measure the impact degree of competition and market concentration a certain 
market faces by investigating the market share of each firm. The HHI takes 
into account the relative size and distribution of the firms in a market and 
approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms of 
relatively equal size. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the 
market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases. 
It is intended to correct the possible misleading results guided only by the 
number of firms in the market. For example, an index of the number of firms 
will consider a market with 100 firms as competitive without recognising 
that two firms share 90% of the market, with the other 98 firms sharing only 
the remaining 10%. To account for both the number of firms and their 
market shares, the HHI is defined as the sum of the squared market share of 
each firm in a market as expressed in following equations 3 and 4:  
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where 
i  : the i-th airlines in the market, 
n : the number of airlines in the market, 
iS  : the annual volume of the i-th airlines, 
iA  : the market share of the i-th airlines, and 
HHI: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the market. 
 
According to the definition of the HHI, the greater the HHI the less the 
competition exists in the market.  In the extreme cases, a monopolistic 
market has an HHI equivalent to 1, and the HHI of a market with a perfectly 
competitive structure is close to zero.   
Therefore, HHI is expected to have a positive sign since a low-
competition environment will all others things being equal induce a higher 
traffic growth. 
 
Isolation of the Alliance Impact by Separating Alliance and Non-alliance 
Effects   
Given that traffic is explained by alliance and non-alliance factors, 
alliance impact can be deducted by neutralizing the influence of the latter. In 
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other words, the evaluation of the alliance impact relies on the isolation of 
the RGDPPC effect, and therefore, on the comparison of the observed traffic 
variation with the traffic variation induced by RGDPPC during the post-
alliance period. 
Suppose that passenger traffic is a function of RGDPPC according to the 
equation below:  
 
LogPASSt = a + b LogRGDPPCt                (5) 
 
It follows that parameter b represents the elasticity of traffic with respect 
to RGDPPC, given that the endogenous and the exogenous variables are 
expressed in logarithmic terms: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of an autoregressive traffic regression model—that is, one 
where the lagged value of the dependent variable appears as an explanatory 
variable on the right-hand side of the equation—b represents only the 
RGDPPC short term impact on traffic. Its long term or total impact is then 
given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering that the percentage variation in RGDPPC from alliance 
formation (t) to post-alliance period (t+) is g%, it follows that the passenger 
traffic change induced by RGDPPC will be bg% (or bLTg%). If the observed 
percentage traffic variation during the given period is k%, then the 
percentage change in traffic brought about by the alliance formation can be 
approximated by (k-bg)% [or (k-bLTg)%]. An approximate value of the 
absolute change in traffic that results from the alliance formation is then 
given by r[(k-bg)/100] or r[(k-bLTg)/100] where r indicates the passenger 
traffic level at (t).  
Because, as the airlines themselves have mentioned in the 
aforementioned survey and interviews, any given impact on traffic is 
generally observed quite rapidly—that is, within the first two years after 
their joining the alliance—t+ is set arbitrarily to t+2 and k% is equal to: 
  (6) 
t-1PASS t  –   PASS
PASS t-1
RGDPPC t  –   RGDPPC t-1
RGDPPC t-1
b =
(1-estimated coefficient of PASS 
t-1
 )
b
 b
LT 
= (7)
  (6) 
(7)
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k% =  
 
One of the main weaknesses of this methodology is that it assumes that 
the alliance impact is equal to the observed variation in traffic volume, that 
is, k%, whenever the RGDPPC is found to be non-significant (b = 0). The 
reason is that RY and CAP are considered as alliance factors whereas 
RGDPPC as a non-alliance factor. This can lead to a misestimation of the 
alliance impact on passenger traffic insofar as fares and capacity do not 
depend solely on alliance strategies; they are clearly influenced by a set of 
other factors independent of alliance formation9. 
ESTIMATION METHOD AND DATA 
The parameters will be determined by a time-series linear regression 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) unless the detection of heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation or both, requires the use of generalized least squares (GLS) 
in order to obtain efficient estimators and to render the usual hypothesis-
testing procedure valid. In the case of heteroskedasticity, the White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix is chosen in order to produce 
consistent coefficient’s standard errors. In the autocorrelation or both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the estimated generalized least 
squares (EGLS) is required; but one can also simply introduce the one-
period lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables. 
The time span is the pre-alliance period (1982 to t) where t is defined as 
the date when the two partners involved extended their bilateral agreement to 
the route under consideration. Whenever the cooperation agreement entered 
in force in the first semester of year t, year t is considered as the alliance 
formation date. In case the cooperation began later in the year, In the 
opposite case, t+1 year is supposed to be the alliance formation date. One 
major problem which could not be overcome is that the pre-alliance period is 
often quite short to allow consistent econometric results. This is especially 
true for the partnerships that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The main tests used to assess the quality of the estimation are the 
adjusted R2 statistics, which gives a measure of the goodness of fit, and the F 
                                                 
9 A fare and capacity model should have been estimated in order to quantify exactly the impact of an alliance on these 
variables, that is, which part of their changes during the post alliance period is due to the alliance and which is not. If it 
is assumed that φ and ω indicate respectively the part of the variation of fare and capacity that is not due to an alliance 
then the alliance impact is equal to (k-bg-φdf-ωcv)% when b ≠ 0 or (k-φdf-ωcv)% when b = 0, where f% and v% 
represents respectively the variation of fares and capacity over the t+2 and t period. The approach used above supposes 
explicitly that φ and ω are zero. It follows there is overestimation of the alliance impact on traffic whenever (φdf)% > 
-(ωcv)% and underestimation whenever (φdf)% < -(ωcv)%.    
 PASSt+2 - PASSt
(8)PASS t 
(8)
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statistics, which constitutes a measure of the overall significance of the 
estimated regression (joint test that all the regression coefficients are zero). 
Furthermore, some additional tests will be used to check whether some 
important assumptions of the classical linear regression model are fulfilled. 
More specifically, the hypothesis that disturbances are homoscedastic (White 
test) and uncorrelated (Durbin-Watson test) has to be controlled for. In the 
particular case the lagged dependent variable appears among the exogenous 
variables, the h-Durbin test will be used to test the error serial 
autocorrelation of order one.  
In all cases, the e-Views software package is used in parallel with SPSS. 
The latter has been chosen in order to proceed to a step-wise regression 
which aims at determining which of all the explanatory variables is the most 
significant one.  
The passenger and capacity data have been obtained by the series 
“Traffic by flight stage” published by International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). When such data were missing, they were obtained 
directly from the airlines (Air Canada year 1997) and the US DOT 
(KLM/Northwest Airlines years 1999-2001, American Airlines/Finnair years 
1996-1997, Aeromexico/Delta Air Lines year 2000, Air France/Delta Air 
Lines year 1997 and SAS-United Airlines year 1991). Since the US DOT 
does not publish data on a one-way basis but on a round trip basis, data for 
any specific year, for which data are missing, had to be split based on each 
one-way route’s past average percentage of total traffic.10 For five additional 
routes, specific computation was needed in order to overcome the problem 
with missing data in relation to traffic and capacity for some specific years.11 
It should be stressed that in all cases, the estimation of non-available data, 
whatever method is used, tends to exacerbate the problem of measurement 
error, a phenomenon frequently met in econometrics. 
Real GDP per capita was obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database. All GDP series are 
expressed in local currency. 
The world passenger revenue per passenger kilometre (in USD) was 
obtained by ICAO Financial Data Commercial Airlines. The data concerning 
the National inflation rates (Consumer Prices Index change of rate) data were 
obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. For both 
                                                 
10 That was the case of New York-Mexico-New York (Aeromexico-2000), Paris-New York-Paris (Air France-1997), 
Amsterdam-Chicago-Amsterdam (KLM-1999/2000), Amsterdam-Los Angeles-Amsterdam (KLM-1999/2000), 
Amsterdam-New York-Amsterdam (KLM-1999/2000), New York-Helsinki-New York (Finnair-1996/1997), Paris-
Chicago-Paris (Air France-1997), Miami-Mexico-Miami (Aeromexico-2000) and Merida-Miami-Merida 
(Aeromexico-2000). 
11 London-Madrid for 1986 and Iberia, Frankfurt-Stockholm for 1991 and SAS, Copenhagen-Frankfurt for 1991 and 
SAS, Bangkok-Copenhagen for 1991 and SAS and Copenhagen-Bangkok for 1991 and SAS. 
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national inflation rates and cross-currency exchange rates, annual average 
measures instead of year-end measure are used. 
The time span is covering the period beginning in 1982 and ending the 
year of the alliance formation.12 Of course, there are some cases of routes for 
which the observation period begins after 1982 because of the data non-
availability: for example, in the case of SkyTeam data are available only 
since 1985. 
There were 124 routes examined. They include hub-hub, hub-non hub 
and non hub-non hub routes, all served by airlines which are members of the 
major four global airline alliances, that is, Wings, Star Alliance, oneworld 
and SkyTeam. Only routes with consistent and sufficient data are included in 
the analysis since the aim of the data collection process was to minimize 
potential sources of measurement error bias, which could affect the 
econometric results and lead to misspecification problems. At any rate, 
special attention has been given to the selection of routes. The selection was 
effected in a way so as to retain the representative character of the sample 
regarding the degree of cooperation and the type of routes for each global 
strategic alliance. 
The sample, as it becomes clear from Table 1, is mainly dominated by 
hub-hub and hub-non hub routes, which represent 96.8% of the total number 
of routes analysed (43.6% and 53.2%, respectively) and 99.2% of the total 
passengers carried during the year 2001 (62.1% and 37.1%, respectively). 
Moreover, Star Alliance tends to be over-represented, while the other three 
major alliances are under-represented compared to their respective weights 
in the total traffic of the four global strategic alliances taken together. This 
fact is related mostly to: (a) the belated entry of certain airlines in a given 
alliance, (b) the late start date of cooperation between two airlines within a 
given alliance, (c) the late start of some flights which began during the 
2000s, and (d) the availability of relevant data. 
 
                                                 
12 Digest of Statistics on the Traffic by Flight Stage Series arranged by flight stage are available since 1969, but for 
the pre-1982 period, data were only published for the four selected months of March, June, September and December. 
Series containing aggregate annual data are only available since 1982. This is the main reason why the observation 
period began in that year.  
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Table 1: Number of routes examined for traffic impact of alliances, by alliance, type of 
routes and number of passengers in 2001 
  Hub-Hub Hub-Non 
Hub 
Non Hub-
Non Hub 
Total 
Wings No of routes 
No of pass. 
0 
(0) 
10 
(1,222,255) 
0 
(0) 
10 
(1,222,255) 
Star Alliance No of routes 
No of pass. 
44 
(8,240,293) 
46 
(4,568,748) 
2 
(91,796) 
92 
(12,900,837) 
oneworld No of routes 
No of pass. 
4 
(1,409,335) 
4 
(316,727) 
0 
(0) 
8 
(1,726,062) 
SkyTeam No of routes 
No of pass. 
6 
(1,697,388) 
6 
(663,506) 
2 
(51,416) 
14 
(2,412,310) 
Total No of routes 
No of pass. 
54 
(11,347,016) 
66 
(6,771,236) 
4 
(143,212) 
124 
(18,261,464) 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The econometric results tend to indicate that strategic alliances lead, on 
average, to a clear improvement in passenger traffic. 
 
Traffic Model 
Overall, the estimated models on the route level are quite satisfactory, 
all having a high goodness of fit and consequently high explanatory powers, 
except for certain routes. In fact, the explained variance of passenger traffic 
represents more than 90% of total variance in 68.5% of the cases, while it 
exceeds the 70% level in 93.5% of the cases. Although, the stepwise 
regression method was used in order to obtain the best specification—that is, 
that which includes the most significant set of exogenous variables and 
guarantees the highest goodness of fit—significant results could not be 
achieved for eight routes. For these routes the adjusted multiple coefficient 
of determination does not exceed 60%. One probable explanation for the low 
explanation of these models could be the short observation period and the 
small number of data points upon which the regressions were based. In any 
case, the conclusion reached is that for these routes, the selected set of 
explicative variables cannot be considered as major and significant 
determinants of passenger traffic.   
Further, the models also present high F-statistics ascertaining their 
validity and the significance of the retained exogenous variables, at least for 
96 routes. Independent variables all had high t-statistics implying that the 
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probability of them actually being zero is null at the 5% significance level. 
On the other hand, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that serial 
autocorrelation of first order of the disturbance was a serious problem for 68 
routes. Thus, a correction was necessary, whether by introducing the lagged 
dependant variable (PASSt-1) in 23 cases or by estimating an Estimated 
Generalized Least-Squares (EGLS) in 41 cases, supposing that the 
disturbances follow an autoregressive error model (AR). 
In all cases, the heteroskedasticity was not a major problem, but 
whenever and wherever it was detected, it was automatically corrected by 
the White method, namely by the estimation of a consistent covariance 
matrix.  
As expected, the CAP has been revealed as the most important factor in 
explaining the variation in passenger numbers, since it appears in the 
majority of the models (97.6%, i.e., 121 routes) and exhibits a high degree of 
statistical significance,13 while the RGDPPC seems to have a more reduced 
impact, being significant in less than half of the cases (49.2%, i.e., 61 
routes). That tends to indicate that these markets—the routes included are 
mostly non North-American originating—have not yet reached maturity. At 
the same time, RGDPPC is not significant for U.S. and Canadian originating 
routes. The short-term elasticity of traffic to RGDPPC lies in a wide range 
from 0.16 to 3.72, while it varies between 0.5 and 2.0 in 65.6% of the routes 
(80.3% when one takes into account the long term elasticity as well). These 
values are satisfactory considering that Bissessur (1996) obtained a similar 
range of values, but they exceed the values obtained previously for the 
income elasticity of demand for international air travel traffic (0.9 to 1.1). 
Finally, it seems that for 50.8% of the selected routes the alliance impact is 
equal to the traffic variation observed during the post-alliance period, since 
the methodology used supposed that whenever RGDPPC is found to be non-
significant, any traffic variation induced by RGDPPC is null.  
As indicated above, the capacity provided by the alliances is present in 
nearly all the models. This tends to demonstrate that any change in capacity 
introduced by an alliance is very likely to affect the traffic carried by the 
partners and therefore the network economies which might result. In one-
third of the cases, the coefficient is less than unity, which means that any 
change in alliance capacity results in a lower than proportional increase in 
traffic. 
As far as the real yield is concerned, the results were quite disappointing 
given that the price variable does not appear in many regressions. This 
variable seems to influence significantly the passenger traffic only in the 
case of 16 routes (12.9% of the total routes). This contradicts previous 
                                                 
13 One should indicate that the Granger causality test performed on the route level does not support the hypothesis of 
a two-way relationship between CAP and PASS revealing that passenger traffic does not  Granger-cause capacity.  
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findings obtained by Iatrou (2004), which pointed to a negative and 
statistically significant price elasticity of demand for international passenger 
traffic. One possible reason is that the price variable retained is a global one, 
that is, one which measures the world trend of fares. Even if the fares listed 
in the ABC World Airways Guide had been used, there would have many 
chances that the same problem would have appeared, as Bissessur (1996) 
had already pointed out, since these fares are not the actual fares passengers 
are required to pay owing to the widespread practice of discounting. As for 
the hub-hub routes, one additional reason is that often they do not represent 
the passengers’ final destination but an intermediary point to their final 
destination. In that case, the fares paid are those of the origin country and not 
those of the hub country. This is certainly valid also for the hub-non hub 
routes but not for the non hub-non hub routes. 
The HHI variable introduced to measure the route specific competition 
effect on traffic does not appear to be a major determinant of passenger 
traffic since it is significant for only 22 routes (17.7%). The estimated 
coefficient is positive in all cases and lies between 0.05 and 0.5 except for 
one route where it exceeds 1 (1.322). The competition measure has therefore 
the expected sign indicating that low competition positively affects allied 
airlines traffic. HHI limited impact could be due in some extent to the 
limited degree of competition which characterized the routes of our samples. 
The coefficient for the dummy introduced in order to capture and 
neutralize the consequences of war or/and recession have the expected 
negative sign in all the models it appears (42 routes, i.e., 33.9%). On 
average, the coefficient lies between -0.012 and -0.098: this means that 
adverse events reduced traffic from 2.7% to 27.2%.  
 
Alliance Impact 
As stated earlier, the alliance impact is given by the traffic variation 
observed during the post-alliance period, when such variation cannot be 
attributed to non-alliance factors. So it is necessary to remove the RGDPPC 
effect in order to obtain this impact at least for those routes which are 
affected by RGDPPC. In a total of 124 routes, 61 were affected by both 
alliance and non-alliance factors (GDP). For the rest however, it can be 
safely concluded that the change in traffic is mainly due to alliance 
strategies. Table 2 presents the results for each global strategic alliance 
separately. 
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Global Impact 
All in all, the impact of global strategic alliances is, on average, 
significant and positive. The computation gives an estimated passenger 
increase of 9.4%, which implies an additional traffic of 1.5 millions (Table 
2). The main part of this effect appears however, by the second year of the 
alliance formation since in the first one the traffic increase is just 2.3% 
compared with 6.9% for the second year (Table 3).  
Table 2: Traffic impact of airline alliance, for four major global strategic alliances as 
observed in the second year after the alliance formation in relation to the pre-alliance 
period 
Alliance Additional traffic (vol.) Traffic increase (%) 
SkyTeam 227,694 11.0% 
Oneworld -62,875 -3.4% 
Star Alliance 1,272,787 11.7% 
Wings 43,327 4.6% 
Total 1,480,933 9.4% 
Table 3:  Traffic impact of airline alliances, for four major global strategic alliances, 
during the post-alliance period of each alliance. The first column presents the t+1 effects 
while the second column the changes observed in year t+2 in relation to the year t+1 
Alliance 1st year effect 2nd year effect 
SkyTeam -3.1% 14.6% 
oneworld 2.1% -5.6% 
Star Alliance 3.8% 7.6% 
Wings -3.0% 7.8% 
Total 2.3% 6.9% 
 
Impact by global strategic alliance 
Two of the strategic alliances considered, that is, Star Alliance and 
SkyTeam, present a traffic increase directly attributable to the alliance 
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formation which exceeds the average observed: 11.7% and 11.0%, 
respectively.   
The results are quite different for the two other alliances: Wings 
presents a rise much lower than the average estimated (i.e., 4.7%), while 
oneworld a substantial decrease (i.e., -3.4%). The lower impact as far as the 
former alliance is concerned can be explained by the fact that the given 
strategic alliance is made up of only two airlines, which cover mainly the 
transatlantic area, and also by the fact that the sample is exclusively 
composed of hub-non hub routes since the hub-hub routes cooperation 
(Amsterdam-Detroit, Amsterdam-Minneapolis and Amsterdam-Memphis) 
began quite early, with the alliance formation (1993). The positive impact 
found in the case of Wings hub-non hub routes should be stressed; this 
finding shows that the strategic alliance has positive benefits for the entire 
flight network, and not only for hub-hub routes, and that the existence of 
antitrust immunity acts in that way. The negative impact as far as oneworld 
is concerned is due to several reasons. Two of the major members, American 
Airlines and British Airways, have not managed to extend their cooperation 
as they would have wished, as their proposed strategic cooperation has not 
been granted antitrust immunity by the US DOT for anticompetitive reasons. 
This has excluded the possibility of any code share cooperation on the 
transatlantic routes and between U.S. and European hubs. Besides, these two 
airlines were late in developing code share practices on behind-beyond 
flights. These facts have obviously affected in the same adverse way the 
other alliance members, since American Airlines and British Airways 
constitute the main alliance decision makers—it should not be forgotten that 
these two airlines have a 10% stake in Iberia. 
On the opposite side, the high alliance impact observed for Star Alliance 
seems to be due the existence of an extended network in which 17 airlines 
participate (October 2003), and to the antitrust immunity enjoyed by of the 
two core members of the alliance (Lufthansa and United Airlines). The same 
seems to be true in the case of SkyTeam since it presents an extended and 
complementary network. The positive results of SkyTeam can be attributed 
to: (a) the worldwide geographical coverage which Air France and Delta Air 
Lines, the core members, offer; (b) the participation of two of the most 
efficient hubs (in Europe and in United States) in terms of traffic and 
connections provided (Charles de Gaulle and Atlanta); and (c) the tighter 
cooperation adopted in 1998 after the signing of a new bilateral agreement 
between France and the U.S. (which provided for more flights connecting 
the two countries). 
 
Impact during the Post-alliance Period 
A more in depth analysis of the alliance impact per period, as presented 
in Table 2, reveals that alliances have led to a reduction in traffic for both 
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SkyTeam and Wings during the first year of the post-alliance period. This 
negative impact can be attributed to the fact that the selected routes sampled 
include airlines which can be characterized as founding members: Air 
France, Delta Air Lines and Aeromexico for SkyTeam; KLM and Northwest 
Airlines for Wings. This tends to show that the alliance needs time to 
produce any positive benefits in terms of higher traffic. Further, Air France 
and Delta Air Lines used to cooperate with other airlines before setting up 
SkyTeam. Delta Air Lines was a member of Atlantic Excellence having a 
partnership with Swissair. Thus, some time was certainly needed not only to 
overcome the change of partner, but also to achieve network harmonization, 
to transfer Delta Air Lines European hub activities from Zurich to Paris, and 
for Delta Air Lines passengers to get familiarized with the new partnerships. 
Additionally, it is commonly acknowledged that a strategic alliance needs 
more time to produce positive results than a simpler type of cooperation. 
As far as Wings is concerned, the negative results might be due to 
Northwest Airlines facing financial situation in that particular period and to 
the exclusive analysis of hub-non hub routes.  
By contrast, Star Alliance, which seems to be the most successful global 
alliance among the four considered here, presents a positive and gradually 
increasing impact during the two years following the alliance formation: 
3.8% for the first year and 7.6% for the second one. 
 
Impact by Type of Routes 
One would expect that hub-hub routes would have shown a larger 
impact as one of the very aims of alliances is to forward a greater percentage 
of the allied partners’ traffic through hubs. It seems that this is not the case 
since an equivalent positive impact for hub-hub and hub-non hub routes is 
found: 9.3% and 9.4%, respectively.14 Two reasons can explain this 
unexpected result. First, it can be explained by the existence of a large 
number of U.S. (New York, Dallas, Boston and Chicago, for example) and 
European final and non-hub destinations, which can be reached directly 
without necessarily passing through hubs. Secondly, it can also be due to the 
fact that the hub-hub system needs time to function efficiently.  The creation 
of a common network, pricing and scheduling policy as well as the 
harmonization of terminals and technology systems (for example, Computer 
Reservation Systems), that would enable the partners to forward behind-
beyond destinations passengers through their hubs, require certain time to be 
implemented. In addition, certain hubs such as London-Heathrow and 
Frankfurt were already important business centers and had therefore 
                                                 
14 In absolute numbers of course, the impact for hub-hub is twice as large as that for hub-non hub given their larger 
traffic.  
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significant traffic. In addition, these airports are seriously congested with 
little space for expansion.  
The non hub-non hub routes present a positive increase in traffic, an 
increase directly attributable to the alliance formation, but this result cannot 
be considered a significant one, given the very limited number of routes (4) 
included in the sample studied. 
Table 4: Traffic impact of airline alliances, by type of routes 
 
Type of route % 
Hub-Hub 9.3% 
Hub-Non Hub 9.4% 
Non Hub-Non Hub 11.6% 
 
Alliances seem to have important spill over effects as they influence 
positively the allied airlines’ traffic on their entire network. 
 
Impact by Type of Cooperation 
The greater impact by far is brought about by strategic alliances with 
and without antitrust immunity: 14.6% and 9.8%, respectively. A strategic 
alliance with antitrust immunity presents a higher increase, since it enables 
partners to follow a common scheduling/pricing policy and to coordinate 
networks. This result confirms that the simple joining of a given alliance is 
not sufficient by itself to lead to traffic improvement and that the tighter the 
cooperation, the higher the benefits enjoyed in terms of traffic.  
A quite surprising result is that of code share since the estimated 
increase in traffic brought about by this type of cooperation is almost 
insignificant (1.3%) and well below that of frequent flyer programs (FFP), 
the simplest type of cooperation. This is entirely due to the negative impact 
on Star Alliance code shared routes (-2.1% versus 7.6% for oneworld the 
other alliance for which code share routes are considered in the selected 
sample). The more plausible reason for this paradox is that the sample under 
examination included routes on which there is virtually no competition, and 
therefore there was no additional traffic to gain over from other competitors. 
FFP on the other hand, tends to register a more significant increase since the 
customers gain more tangible and immediate benefits from FFPs, such as 
mileage, than from code share. 
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Table 5: Traffic impact of airline alliances, by type of cooperation 
Type of cooperation  % 
Frequent Flier Programs 4.6% 
Code share 1.3% 
Strategic alliance without antitrust immunity 9.8% 
Strategic alliance with antitrust immunity 14.6% 
 
In comparison with FFP, which is a cost-free and quickly-producing 
results-type of cooperation, strategic alliances seem to present a more 
pronounced positive impact in the second year of the post-alliance period, 
since they obviously need more time to produce their benefits. This 
conclusion agrees with Gallacher’s statement (1997) that FFPs’ ability to 
influence business class travelers has made them more important to global 
alliances than code share. 
 
Impact by Route Distance 
As expected, the largest impact is observed on long haul flights in 
comparison with short haul ones15 (11.8% versus 7.4%) since a larger part of 
passengers with behind-beyond destinations prefers to travel with allied 
airlines which offer better scheduling and connection times. Another reason 
contributing to this result might be the limited competition, which 
characterizes these types of routes, given the cooperation between allied 
airlines. 
However, the short haul routes present—in the short term, and more 
particularly in the first year of the post-alliance period—a greater increase in 
traffic since they constitute in many cases the final destinations of the 
travelers or tourist or/and business centers especially in the case of Europe 
(Paris, London, Amsterdam and Frankfurt). By contrast, the greater impact 
for long haul routes is observed during the second year of the post-alliance 
period, as the positive effect of tighter cooperation in an increased number of 
behind-beyond destinations, network harmonization and the entrance of new 
airlines into the alliance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Long haul routes are the intercontinental (from to continent to continent) ones while short haul routes are those 
effected within the same continent.  
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Table 6: Traffic impact of airline alliances, by distances of routes 
Route distance % 
Long haul 11.8% 
Short haul 7.4% 
 
Short haul routes register a smaller traffic increase because these routes 
present more options in terms of fares, face increased competition from low-
cost airlines and alternative means of transport. On long haul routes 
however, allied partners put an emphasis as customers seek more benefits in 
terms of mileage and quality of service.  
CONCLUSION 
On average, it seems that strategic alliances lead to a significant increase 
of traffic on alliance routes. 
As expected, the alliance impact has been higher in the case of hub-hub 
routes given the airlines’ increased interest to serve behind-beyond 
destination passengers through their hubs by the creation of an efficient hub-
and-spoke system. Equally important is the finding that a similar increase, 
even though slightly lower, was observed for hub-non hub routes. This 
means that alliances tend to influence positively airlines’ extended networks 
and not only their hub-hub routes. 
The more strategic the cooperation among the allied partners, the greater 
the impact, as this type of cooperation with the tighter links provides for 
common scheduling, pricing policy, etc. 
Further, long haul routes lead to better results in terms of additional 
traffic since the competition on those routes tends to be limited or even non-
existent, and since the partners tend to offer a worldwide coverage. 
However, any alliance impact seems to become apparent within two years 
after the alliance formation. 
Finally, it is the global strategic alliances, which can be characterized by 
a greater number of allied airlines and thus an extended network, by the 
existence of antitrust immunity, at least between the core members, and by 
an efficient and productive hub-and-spoke system (Star Alliance and 
SkyTeam, for example) are the ones that tend to take more advantage of the 
alliance formation. 
The above conclusions confirm those drawn by the recent surveys 
conducted by Iatrou and Alamdari (2003) and Iatrou (2004), which 
interviewed a large number of carriers’ executives of the four alliances 
involved. A quick comparison shows that global strategic alliances lead to an 
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increase in traffic, all others things being equal, within the first two years 
after the alliance formation, since 64% of the interviewees answered that the 
alliance impact on traffic exceeded 6%, while 43% of them has indicated that 
this effect was apparent within the first two years of the alliance formation. 
While the survey showed that 50% of the interviewed airlines believed that 
the impact is of the same range for each of the first two years of the post-
alliance period, according to the econometric analysis, it is in the second 
year of the post-alliance that the alliance impact on traffic reaches its peak 
and it is double that observed during the first year.  
Obviously, the above research could be extended and completed in 
many ways to get a more accurate assessment of airline alliance effects on 
traffic. First, the hypothesis considering real fares and capacities as alliance 
factors should be relaxed given that they cannot be considered as totally 
dependent of alliances, and this is especially true as far as fares are 
concerned. Secondly, a more accurate fare measurement should be taken into 
account in order to capture the price effect on traffic, since it has been 
shown, at least on a global level, that traffic volume is negatively correlated 
to real fares (Iatrou, 2004). More specifically, a route level measure should 
be retained as it was done in the research by Bissessur (1996). Thirdly, in 
theory, non-alliance routes could be used to benchmark the alliance impact 
in a attempt aiming to measure true alliance traffic impact, so as to reach a 
more reliable assessment. But such a comparison will be possible only in the 
future when new routes are introduced because there are practically no data 
about the non-alliance routes to use for benchmarking purposes. Most likely, 
any new routes introduced in the future will follow the alliance/code share 
practice. Since partner airlines tend to feed domestic traffic onto their 
alliance routes and or reroute it through their alliance routes (Oum, Park & 
Zhang, 2000; Park & Zhang, 1998), non-alliance routes traffic could decline 
and as a result the alliance impact could be lesser than that estimated. 
Finally, one should extend the analysis of the effects of complementary and 
parallel airline alliances on partner airlines’ outputs in order to confirm the 
conclusion drawn by Oum, Park and Zhang (2000) and Park and Zhang 
(1998) according to which complementary alliances lead to a increase in 
partners’ output while parallel ones lead, on the contrary, to a decrease in 
partners’ output. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper identifies important topical knowledge areas required of individuals 
employed in airport operations and management positions. A total of 116 airport 
managers and airfield operations personnel responded to a survey that sought to 
identify the importance of various subject matter for entry level airport operations 
personnel. The results from this study add to the body of research on aviation 
management curriculum development and can be used to better develop university 
curriculum and supplemental training focused on airport management and 
operations. Recommendations are made for specialized airport courses within 
aviation management programs. Further, this study identifies for job seekers or 
individuals employed in entry level positions those knowledge requirements 
deemed important by airport managers and operations personnel at different sized 
airports.  
INTRODUCTION 
In a speech given at the fifth annual General Aviation Forecast 
Conference, then University Aviation Association (UAA) President James E. 
Crehan called upon the aviation industry to define future personnel needs in 
terms of entry level qualifications and experiences so that UAA member 
institutions could respond to those needs. Previously, Lehrer (1992) had 
brought to the attention of the aviation community the increasing emphasis 
of university and college accrediting bodies to assess the learning that occurs 
within an aviation program. He raised the question of what skills, knowledge 
and values should a well educated aviation graduate possess? His question 
followed his previous work (1985) of trying to identify an aviation 
management curriculum for the benefit of students and the industry.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
Stephen M. Quilty, A.A.E., is an Associate Professor in the Aviation Studies Program, 
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Documentation of industry needs in flight education has been well 
developed. Not as well developed is documentation in the aviation 
management field and, in particular, airport management and operations. 
Research is still needed to help validate the degree of importance for various 
knowledge requirements as they apply to specific areas and various types of 
aviation management. In his critique of aviation management programs, 
Philips (2004) recommends that the term “aviation management” needs to be 
better defined and have improved pedagogical development. This paper 
helps to articulate future personnel knowledge requirements for entry level 
positions in airport operations, drawing on the assumption that the most 
common path to the position of airport manager or director begins with entry 
level airfield operation positions. This assumption is supported by Sackett 
(1992), Howell (1997), Prather (1999) and Quilty (2004). 
Most university curricula have but one course in airport management as 
a result of guidelines established by the Council on Aviation Accreditation 
(CAA), an accrediting body for non-engineering university aviation 
programs. Those guidelines reflect an earlier industry and U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA; 1989) assessment of what was important for 
a broad aviation management education. The broad education perspective 
was all inclusive and covered air traffic management, airline management, 
airport management, general aviation service management, aviation 
manufacturing management and other service sector management. 
Invariably, in attempting to cover such broad areas, the recommended 
courses tended to be generic and left many specific career track topics 
lacking in the requisite knowledge or skill content necessary to fully 
understand the intended career track. 
The current CAA guidelines (2003) identify a singular course called 
aviation management. It also calls for singular courses in aviation law, 
aviation business administration, aviation economics, and aviation safety. 
Not identified in the guidelines are what specific content or knowledge 
requirements are to be included in each course title. Quilty (2004) asserted 
that a single course in aviation management did not adequately prepare 
students for entry level or career positions in airports. Adequate research 
study related to the requirements of the airport industry is lacking. The study 
results included in this paper strive to address the knowledge and topic areas 
required by the airport industry for an airport management curriculum. 
Previous journal articles have sought to quantify and validate knowledge 
requirements for airport management degree programs at colleges and 
universities. Lehrer (1985) identified 31 academic course titles and 
descriptions. He stated in his dissertation that one of the first attempts to 
define an airport management curriculum was in 1949 (p. 45). Truitt, 
Hamman, and Palinkas (1994) identified courses important for a graduate 
program in airport administration. Kaps and Widick (1995) suggested 
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educational requirements for a career in airport management at the 
undergraduate level. Fuller and Truitt (1997) surveyed airport consultants 
about course curriculum matters. 
Prather (1998) conducted a study seeking the views of airport managers 
on the most appropriate fields of study, academic degrees, and aviation 
courses. Ruiz et al. (2000) conducted a study to determine the degree to 
which graduates of a university aviation management program perceived the 
usefulness of the program for their career choices. Kaps and NewMyer 
(2001) reviewed published material from State Aviation organizations that 
provided advice to airport managers and identified important and common 
subject matter material. Quilty (2004) reviewed airport job descriptions over 
a three year period and identified common knowledge and skill requirements 
listed in the descriptions.  
Most of the studies suggest that skills and knowledge requirements for 
airport operations and management have changed over the years. Based on 
these studies, the requirements are becoming more diverse, challenging and 
technical. While identifying specific courses similar to the CAA guidelines, 
much of the research is lacking in the more descriptive content knowledge 
requirements necessary for today’s airport management graduates. The 
research also is lacking in identification of the importance of skills and 
knowledge for different sized airports. 
This paper contributes to the aviation and airport management field by 
identifying knowledge requirements deemed important by airport managers 
and employees for those who seek entry level positions in the field of airport 
operations. This information forms a basis for establishing both performance 
objectives, learning outcomes, and curriculum content for educational and 
training programs. 
METHODOLOGY 
The survey instrument used in the study was targeted toward individuals 
whose job positions are related to the safe operation of an airfield, such as 
airfield operation, maintenance and inspection personnel. Surveyed for this 
study were individuals having responsibility for hiring or supervision of 
airfield operation employees, and individuals employed in operations 
positions. The study specifically targeted airfield operations rather than 
terminal or landside operations as airfield operations is an area of qualified 
concern for the FAA in light of changes to Part 139 (Certification of 
Airports), 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).  
The survey instrument was developed by identifying 92 knowledge 
variables derived from Part 139; job descriptions analyzed and used in 
Quilty’s (2004) study; the CAA Accreditation Standards Manual (CAA, 
2003); Flouris and Gibson’s (2002) survey instrument, curricular material 
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from various university aviation programs, and a similar knowledge list 
developed for the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) 
Corporate Aviation Management Development Committee (Quilty, 1996). 
The survey was approved for use by the Human Subject Review Board at 
Bowling Green State University, Ohio, and was pretested among members of 
the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) Airport Training 
Committee. 
Data were collected from both large-hub, medium-hub, small-hub, non-
hub and general aviation airport operators. The airport categories are 
identified by the FAA National Plan of Integrated Airport System (NPIAS). 
The hub designation relates to the number of operations and passenger 
enplanements an airport has over a calendar year time. For the year 2003, 
there were 31 large-hub airports, 37 medium-hub airports, 68 small-hub 
airports, 247 non-hub airports, and 2,961 other airports (other commercial 
service, reliever, general aviation) in the NPIAS (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2004, p. 5). 
An initial electronic mailing of the survey was made in July, 2004, to 
356 individuals who were identified in the 2003 membership directory of 
AAAE. Of the initial mailing, 82 e-mail addresses were returned 
undeliverable and 274 e-mails were successfully transmitted. There were two 
follow up e-mails requesting responses in August of 2004. Receipt of 
surveys was stopped in late September. Of the 274 valid e-mails delivered, 
116 responses (42.3%) were received and deemed usable for evaluation.  
Demographic information collected for this study included the 
respondent’s position and title; whether the respondent was in a supervisory 
position or an entry level position; the number of years a respondent was 
employed in the airport profession; gender; the level of formal education 
received; and the size of the airport.   
The survey requested Likert-type responses in two columns. The survey 
asked individuals employed in airport management and operation positions 
their perception of those knowledge requirements important for individuals 
employed in the field of airfield operations or for those individuals having 
duties for inspection or safety of the airfield. It further asked them to rank 
the level of knowledge they believed new hires or recent applicants had 
about the topic areas. This paper reports only on the results from the first 
column—the ranking of knowledge topics in importance by managers and 
operations personnel. Participants in the study were given the instructions 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Instructions given to survey respondents  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
In the LEFT COLUMN, identify how important          In the RIGHT COLUMN, identify how prepared 
the topic is to an airfield operations person,                  you feel operation new hires or applicants are,  
based on the numbers 1 through 6 below.                     using the scale A through E below.  
 
 1 - EXTREMELY IMPORTANT                              WELL PREPARED - A 
 2 - VERY IMPORTANTADEQUATELY                 PREPARED - B 
 3 - SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT                                SOMEWHAT PREPARED - C 
 4 - NOT VERY IMPORTANT                                   LESS THAN PREPARED - D 
 5 - NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT                                NOT AT ALL PREPARED - E 
 6 - DO NOT KNOW IMPORTANCE 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A mean and standard deviation analyses were accomplished for all 92 
variables from which their overall ranking (1 is most important) was 
determined (Table 3). Statistical analysis was accomplished by the Statistical 
Consulting Center at Bowling Green State University using SAS 
programming. Because changes were made by the FAA to 14 CFR Part 139 
during the data collection time period, the variable “knowledge of airport 
certification specifications requirements and content (Table 2, item 11 and 
Appendix B)” was made obsolete by the changes and therefore was not 
included in subgroup analysis. Performing a statistical comparison to 
determine the degree of importance between each of the remaining 91 topic 
variables would provide an analysis of questionable detail due to the number 
of variables. A grouping of like topics with a comparison between the groups 
would have more meaning to practitioners.  
Due to the individual statistical processing difficulty, the 91 variables 
were first grouped into 26 subgroups. Grouping of the 26 variables into 
topical subject matter was accomplished by the researcher in conjunction 
with a review of the groups by knowledgeable individuals in the field of 
airport management. To allow for further statistical analyses, the 26 
subgroups were placed into the 7 major groups. The major groupings reflect 
further similarity of topic areas and are grouped as they may relate to a 
particular course content or offering within a university department. The 7 
major groups and respective subgroups are listed on Table 3. The subgroups 
are described in Appendix A. The variables listed in Appendix A were 
randomly listed in the survey. 
To determine the degree of reliability and consistency among the 
multivariate factors that made up each major group, a Cronbach’s Alpha 
analysis was performed on each group (Table 4). Determination of 
Cronbach’s Alpha will help to assess whether or not the choice of an 
included variable in a group is appropriate or not. 
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In assessing whether significant differences exist among the major 
group means, a repeated measures analysis of variance was performed. The 
analysis looked at one major group mean and compared it to the other group 
means to see whether or not differences exist between the groups. A Tukey 
analysis was then conducted to identify where those differences occurred 
(Table 5). The Tukey analysis allows for clusters or groups of variables to be 
compared to each other to determine significant differences among them. 
 
Study Limitations 
This study was limited to AAAE members employed at various airports 
in the United States. It is unknown how many individuals in management, 
supervisory or entry level operation positions are not members of AAAE, 
and therefore were not included in the solicitation. Another limitation is the 
degree of understanding respondents may have about the meaning behind 
each of the knowledge topics identified, or the degree of semantic bias 
individuals may have for the various words used to describe the knowledge 
topic. The study did not attempt to mitigate these limitations. 
Another limitation is the geographic area solicited for the study. For 
example, responses to some topic variables such as “knowledge of snow and 
ice control plans and snow removal operations” would receive widely 
disparate rankings depending upon whether one was employed in the 
southern or northern part of the United States. The study did not attempt to 
mitigate this limitation. 
A further limitation of the study is the seasonality of the survey. The 
survey was conducted in the summer months of July to August and so 
responses may reflect several seasonal factors such as staffing shortages due 
to vacations, non-winter operations, or heavy construction activity. The 
study tried to minimize this limitation by seeking response to the survey over 
a three month period. 
Whereas the survey covered different airport hub sizes, errors may exist 
in applying the findings to specific operations. Differences do exist in the 
specific duties and responsibilities of airport operation managers or officers 
depending upon the organizational structure, size of the airport, type of 
operation, and different forms of ownership/operation. This would impact 
how one responded in ranking a particular topic.  
An example of this would be the rating of environmental law and 
regulations as very important by an operations officer at one particular 
airport because he or she is responsible for handling environmental issues 
associated with aviation fuel tanks, deicing, noise or other. An operations 
officer at another airport may rate environmental law low because their 
organization is of such size as to have a separate person or staff function 
responsible for handling that issue. The survey did not ask if environmental 
issues actually existed, only the degree of importance from a knowledge 
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perspective. This particular limitation is minimized to the extent that the 
study sought to better identify specific knowledge areas necessary for entry 
level positions at airports overall, rather than seeking actual specifics for 
different sized airports. However, the latter is presented for basic analysis in 
Appendix B. 
One other limitation placed on the study relates to the educational 
knowledge of the respondents. A respondent’s educational background could 
have an effect on the results in that knowledge or skills learned or practiced 
are more likely to be implemented or used, and those not learned or practiced 
will be less likely to be considered a requirement. For example, an individual 
having an educational background in, or an understanding of, business 
statistics is more likely to incorporate or recognize its use in airport 
operations and therefore would consider it more important than someone 
who did not have similar knowledge or education. Collectively, the study 
attempts to minimize this limitation through the collection of data from 
diverse respondents.  Of the respondents, 13 had high school degrees, two 
had 2-year associate degrees, 59 had a 4-year undergraduate degree, 31 had a 
masters or higher degree, one had military education only, and 10 had 
military education plus some college course work but no degree. 
RESULTS 
Of the 116 responses, 18 (15.6%) were from airport managers, 62 
(53.4%) from airport operations supervisors, and 36 (31.0%) from entry 
level employees. The airport managers were primarily from small-hub, non-
hub or general aviation airports because that position was targeted as having 
more direct involvement in airfield operations.  
Responses from large-hub airports numbered 22 (19.0%) of the total, 
medium-hub airports numbered 19 (16.4%), small-hub airports numbered 16 
(13.8%), non-hub airports numbered 31 (26.7%), and general 
aviation/reliever airports numbered 28 (24.1%) respondents. The 
demographic responses included 94 males (81.0%) and 22 females (19.0%). 
These demographics provided a cross section of the airport organizations 
sought for the study.  
Table 2 provides the overall mean ranking of the 91 variables (with 
shortened titles) identified in the survey. A full description of the knowledge 
variables listed in Table 2 is provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Priority ranking of 92 knowledge variables important for individuals employed in 
the field of airfield operations or for those individuals having duties for inspection or 
safety of the airfield 
Rank Topic M SD 
1 Ground Vehicle Operation 1.181 0.468 
2 Self Inspection 1.198 0.514 
3 Lighting 1.216 0.524 
4 Airport Emergency Plan 1.224 0.439 
5 Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) 1.250 0.558 
6 Part 139 compliance 1.259 0.674 
7 Airport Certification Manual 1.293 0.673 
8 Acronyms 1.388 0.656 
9 Security ID Area 1.422 0.748 
10 Construct Activity 1.526 0.751 
11 Airport Certification Specifications 1.527 0.955 
12 Wildlife 1.569 0.836 
13 Airport Security Plan 1.578 0.876 
14 Part 77 Obstructions 1.724 0.809 
15 Airport Design and Layout 1.802 0.836 
16 General Aviation Operations 1.809 0.837 
17 Air Traffic Control Operations 1.828 0.738 
18 Airport Rescue/Firefighting 1.888 0.967 
19 Fueling Operations 1.914 0.830 
20 Aircraft Regulations 1.922 0.886 
21 Federal Regulations 1.978 0.861 
22 Communication Center Operation 2.017 0.995 
23 Form 5010 Master Record 2.036 0.914 
24 Snow Removal Operation 2.052 1.369 
25 Airline Operations 2.078 1.039 
26 Management 2.112 0.930 
27 Form 7460-1 Obstructions 2.121 1.065 
28 Construction Methods 2.155 0.871 
29 Air Carrier Security Plan 2.198 1.105 
30 Air Traffic Control Equipment 2.241 0.947 
31 Word and Spreadsheet Applications 2.296 0.878 
32 New Security Technology 2.336 2.336 
33 Air Cargo Security Plan 2.345 1.080 
34 Public Relations 2.353 0.837 
35 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) 2.365 0.911 
36 Organizational Communication 2.379 0.939 
37 Air Taxi Operations 2.379 0.939 
38 Environmental Compliance 2.388 0.892 
39 Department of Transportation (DOT) Hazmat 2.397 0.893 
40 14 CFR Part 191 Sensitive Security Information (SSI) 2.402 1.135 
41 Environmental Laws 2.414 0.781 
42 Public Administration 2.417 0.955 
43 Pavement Deicing 2.474 1.206 
44 Air Cargo Operations 2.483 1.051 
45 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
regulations 
2.483 0.909 
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Table 2: Priority ranking of 92 knowledge variables important for individuals employed in 
the field of airfield operations or for those individuals having duties for inspection or 
safety of the airfield 
46 Police Procedures 2.491 0.880 
47 Noise Requirements 2.500 0.860 
48 Capacity/delay Impact 2.578 1.048 
49 Speech Communication 2.595 1.004 
50 Project Management 2.595 0.942 
51 Human Resource Development (HRD) Processes 2.716 0.940 
52 American Disability Act (ADA) compliance 2.741 0.915 
53 Meteorology 2.750 0.959 
54 Military Operations 2.819 0.965 
55 Bid Specifications 2.828 1.137 
56 Ground Transportation 2.862 1.003 
57 Aviation History 2.862 0.932 
58 New Airport Technology 2.871 0.860 
59 Equipment Operation 2.897 1.281 
60 Contract Administration 2.897 0.954 
61 Aviation Law 2.930 1.041 
62 Facility Maintenance 2.931 0.958 
63 Information Systems (MIS) 2.991 0.982 
64 Master Planning Process 3.009 0.797 
65 Parking Operations 3.043 1.111 
66 Aircraft Deicing 3.071 1.124 
67 Labor Relations 3.104 0.931 
68 Science Principles 3.123 0.933 
69 Risk Management 3.138 0.986 
70 Accounting 3.157 0.979 
71 Travel and Tourism 3.181 0.956 
72 Finance 3.190 0.922 
73 Property Management 3.328 0.949 
74 Electricity Basics 3.345 0.952 
75 Contract Law 3.351 1.064 
76 Building Codes 3.422 0.815 
77 Marketing 3.422 0.886 
78 Helicopter Operations 3.452 0.830 
79 Building Systems 3.461 0.981 
80 Tort Law 3.504 1.045 
81 Politics 3.526 0.952 
82 Civil Engineering 3.531 0.897 
83 Computer Aided Design/Geographical Information System 3.539 1.045 
84 Programming 3.638 1.083 
85 Architecture 3.693 0.832 
86 Social Psychology 3.708 0.820 
87 Statistics 3.741 0.878 
88 Micro Economics 3.781 0.870 
89 Foreign Language 3.796 0.937 
90 Socioeconomics 3.796 0.857 
91 Macro Economics 3.825 0.905 
92 International Commerce 3.895 0.856 
Note. Rank scale is 1 to 5 with 1 being the most important. 
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Table 3 identifies the grouping of the 91 variables into 26 topical subject 
matter subgroups which are further categorized into seven major groups A-F. 
The grouping allows for better statistical analyses and meaning of the 
individual variables. The major groupings reflect similarity of topic areas 
and are grouped as they may relate to a particular course content or offering 
within a university department. Appendix A provides the descriptive wording 
used in the survey. 
Table 3: Identification of seven major groups of knowledge combining the 26 subgroups of 
the 91 knowledge variables important for individuals employed in the field of airfield 
operations or for those individuals having duties for inspection or safety of the airfield 
Group A - 22 variables subgrouped as: 
 Lighting signs and markings (1.22) 
 Self-Inspection (1.49) 
 Part 139 Regulation (1.52) 
 ARFF and Emergency Plan (1.56) 
 Wildlife (1.58) 
 Part 77 Obstructions (2.03) 
 Ground Vehicle Operation (2.19) 
 Hazardous Material (2.22) 
 Snow and Ice Removal (2.24) 
Group B - 7 variables subgrouped as: 
 Security (2.11) 
Group C - 19 variables subgrouped as: 
 Aviation general (2.48) 
 Aircraft Characteristics (2.50) 
 Record management (3.12) 
 Science (3.13) 
Group D - 17 variables subgrouped as: 
 Environment and Noise (2.42) 
 Master Planning and Design (2.47) 
 Ground Transportation (2.96) 
 Building Systems (3.21) 
Group E - 8 variables subgrouped as: 
 Project Management/Construction (2.64) 
 Communication (2.70) 
 Management and Supervision (2.91) 
Group G - 8 variables subgrouped as: 
 Administration (2.98) 
 Contracts and Law (3.10) 
Group F- 10 variables subgrouped as: 
 Marketing (3.21) 
 Finance and Accounting (3.35) 
 Economics (3.71) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Mean (M) of the subgroup is in parenthesis. 
 
Table 4 represents the ranking of the knowledge groups deemed 
important for individuals holding positions in airfield operations at U.S. 
airports. The ranking is based upon the mean (M). The standard deviation 
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(SD) is provided to give an indication of the range of responses from the 
mean.  
A Cronbach’s Alpha analysis (Table 4) was performed on each major 
group to determine the degree of reliability and correlation among the 
multivariate factors comprising each group. Determination of Cronbach’s 
Alpha will help to assess whether or not the choice of an included variable in 
a group is appropriate or not. A correlation of 0.700 or higher is acceptable 
for this study. Due to the multidimensionality of the variables making up 
each group, standardized index values were used. 
Of the seven groups, only Group E had individual topic variables having 
less than 0.700. Reliability in Group E was weak due to low Alpha’s for the 
variables speech communication, management, and human resource and 
development. This means these three topic variables should be included in a 
new or different group. 
 
Table 4: Means and standard deviation for the major groups of knowledge important 
for individuals employed in the field of airfield operations or for those individuals having 
duties for inspection or safety of the airfield 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Cronbach’s Alpha 
Group A 1.906 0.398 0.821 
Group B 2.109 0.698 0.836 
Group C 2.721 0.458 0.806 
Group D 2.713 0.455 0.793 
Group E 2.793 0.573 0.744 
Group F 3.430 0.603 0.866 
Group G 3.078 0.708 0.871 
Note. Alpha deemed reliable for values > 0.700 
 
In assessing whether significant differences exist among the major 
group means a repeated measures analysis of variance was performed. The 
analysis compared one major group mean and to the other group means to 
see whether or not differences existed between the groups. A Tukey analysis 
was then conducted to identify where those differences occurred. The Tukey 
analysis allows for comparing clusters or groups of variables to each other to 
determine significant differences among them. 
Table 5 shows the difference between groups resulting from the Tukey 
analysis. Where a major group shows a significant difference to another 
group (marked by X), an argument can be made that the groups can be 
treated as distinct content areas to be addressed in an education or training 
curriculum.  
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Table 5: Tukey analyses identifying significant differences between major groups of 
knowledge important for individuals employed in the field of airfield operations or for 
those individuals having duties for inspection or safety of the airfield 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F Group G 
Group A  X X X X X X 
Group B   X X X X X 
Group C    O O X X 
Group D     O X X 
Group E      X X 
Group F       X 
Group G        
Note. Tukey critical value w = q.05(7,672) ≈ 0.158. 
X = column and row means are significantly different. 
0 = no difference between column and row means. 
 
Appendix B lists the responses to the survey according to airport size of 
large-hub, medium-hub, small-hub, non-hub, and general aviation reliever as 
defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation (2004). The data are listed 
in both value and graphic form. The graphic form breaks the responses into 
groups of 15, except for the last group of 17. It assists in comparing the rank 
of importance for the 91 variables between the different airport sizes. 
Statistical analysis using airport size is not supported due to the small 
number of responses in each category. However, the breakout does allow for 
some interpretation of what is important at the different sized airports.  
DISCUSSION 
Group A from Table 3 is primarily made up of the operational 
requirements of Subpart D of 14 CFR Part 139 Certification of Airports. 
Subpart D of Part 139 spells out the required inspection and safety measures 
necessary for compliance with the federal regulation. It is not surprising that 
Group A is the most important subject matter grouping. The means of each 
subgroup in Group A is more important than the means for any other 
subgroup except security (Group B). These rankings would reflect the 76 
percent response rate received from airports with airport certification 
requirements. If an airport is certificated under 14 CFR Part 139, it is also 
required to have an airport security plan under 14 CFR Part 1542. 
Cronbach’s Alpha is valuable in ascertaining the degree to which the 
variables contained in the major groups are linked or consistent with one 
another. While the reliability of the variables within each group is shown to 
exist for all (Table 4), Group E has marginal reliability or consistency. This 
means the topic variables contained in Group E are better treated as separate 
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topics. Otherwise, the other groups show consistency of their topic variables 
and allows for further analysis. 
The Tukey analysis is valuable in ascertaining the degree to which the 
variables contained in the major groups are distinct from one another. With 
the exception of Group C and Group D, the remaining groups appear to be 
made up of variables that can be treated as having distinct degrees of 
importance from the other groups (Table 5). The variables in Group C and 
Group D do not show the same degree of distinction and require 
reconstitution.  
The distinction of the major group is of value in that they identify the 
overall degree of importance of the knowledge and content areas within the 
industry and they can be used to identify content to be included in a 
particular course. For instance, the content of Group A could be included in a 
single course or split into two. The content in Group B could also be a 
singular course. While Group C and Group D would need to be 
reconstituted, general aviation principles and aircraft characteristics (Group 
C) could be taught as one course, and environmental, master planning and 
ground transportation (Group D) could make up either a single or dual 
course as well. Within Group E, Group G and Group F, each subgroup is 
easily recognized as a current course at many colleges and universities. 
For those who provide training seminars and workshops to the industry, 
the first two groups of variables shown in Appendix A (subgroups 1-11) and 
B (top 15 topics) should receive the most attention. Developing a university 
curriculum focusing on airport management and operations, however, may 
be a little more difficult to address. This is because colleges and universities 
are expected to provide a broad skill and knowledge set balanced with 
specialized skills and knowledge. 
The data show several of the courses normally associated with 
university curricula in management were rated very low. For instance, micro 
and macro economics, business statistics, and marketing ranked in the lower 
portion of the list (Appendix B). Yet a basic management curriculum 
accredited by the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business 
(AACSB) or CAA calls for a knowledge foundation in those courses 
(AACSB, 1993; CAA 2003). It is difficult to imagine that in practice an 
entry level position does not utilize the basic theories and concepts in those 
courses, but entry level airport position descriptions detail more aviation 
specific knowledge concepts (Prather, 1998; Quilty, 2004). 
The reason for the low rankings of the traditional courses is not clear. 
They could have been ranked low simply because they are considered 
fundamental compared to the other topics. Respondents may have had the 
expectation that an individual would have certain basic knowledge to have 
made it to the level of consideration for an airfield operations position. A 
second reason could be that theory and concepts taught in those courses are 
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not well discerned in practice. This has implications for developing a 
university aviation management curriculum where the basic knowledge 
concepts of economics, statistics and other similar courses need to be 
incorporated into courses such as airport operations, regulatory compliance, 
and security.  
The comparison of topics found in 14 CFR Part 139 to traditional 
business and aviation courses is new in the research. Except for in Kaps and 
NewMyer’s 2001 study, the other research referenced in this paper focused 
primarily on the traditional course offerings in their rankings. Results from 
those studies can be used to gauge the relative importance of traditional 
courses. 
Clearly of importance for entry level airport positions, however, is 
knowledge about the operations of an airport, generally delineated in 14 CFR 
Part 139, but also applied to general aviation airports. Evidence presented by 
Quilty (2004) indicates current post secondary courses related to aviation 
management do not adequately address the skill development or knowledge 
acquisition identified in this study. The results of this study can be used to 
develop a matrix of knowledge requirements that would be addressed within 
an overall curriculum on airport operation and management. Combined with 
information culled from other studies mentioned in this paper, the academic 
community can better respond to the needs of the airport industry by 
incorporating the content identified into course offerings, or by developing 
more specialized course offerings.  
A positive aspect of the identification of specialized courses is that they 
can better prepare an individual for the needs and demands of the airport 
industry. The drawback that exists for specialized course offerings is that 
they often are at the expense of other skills and knowledge area development 
due to the limitation placed on the number of total credit hours allowed at 
most universities. For this reason, it is important for the aviation academic 
community and CAA to think through at what level courses should be taught 
and what skills and knowledge should be addressed at each level. This raises 
the question then of what is the proper balance of courses that will result in a 
reasonable number of credit hours, meet university accreditation and policy 
requirements, and satisfy the needs of the industry? This question 
corresponds to the issues raised by Quilty (2004). 
Based on the study results, it is recommended that a course titled 
“Aviation Management” be dropped from aviation curricula and be replaced 
by a title indicating the specific study area of management to be taught, such 
as airport management, airline management, air cargo management, fixed 
base operations (FBO) management, small airport management, or aviation 
service management. The term “aviation management” should refer to the 
collective offering of courses and material that will develop the skills and 
knowledge of an individual for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the 
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aviation system and furthering its economic and social benefits. Within a 
college or university program, an aviation management curriculum should 
have identifiable tracks or study areas that address the more specific study 
areas mentioned. 
Appendix B provides insight into the relative importance of the topic 
variables between the different sized airports. The reporting of response data 
by airport size is of value in that it is generally the general aviation, non-hub 
and small-hub airports that hire recent graduates, based upon a review of job 
listings posted over the years by AAAE. The qualifications for medium-hub 
and large-hub airports generally require several years of experience for 
consideration. Many airport position announcements seek or prefer at least 
one year of experience in airport operations (Howell, 1997; Quilty, 2004). 
There is unanimous agreement on the 12 top ranked variables for all 
airport sizes, with the notable exception of airfield lighting, signs and 
marking for general aviation airports (Appendix B). Within the top 13 ranked 
topics is a notable variable of interest: knowledge of airport certification 
specifications. Airport certification specifications are no longer a component 
of federal regulation, having been discontinued in February of 2004 with 
revision to 14 CFR Part 139. The purpose of airport certification 
specifications was to address safety and operation of airports receiving 
limited air carrier service. It is understandable that many respondents still 
view the purpose as being important. 
Below the rank of 13, the topics have varying degrees of importance 
among the different sized airports. The variations generally reflect the type 
and nature of airport operations at the different sized airports. For instance, 
general aviation operations is a knowledge requirement ranked 16 for all but 
large-hub airports, which have very little general aviation activity. Therefore, 
one would not expect it to have as much importance overall. Knowledge 
about air traffic control equipment is ranked higher by non-hub airports most 
likely because those airports have locally operated and supported 
navigational aids, or have contract control towers in operation that require 
the airport to operate and maintain.  
Some topic variables, such as snow removal operations, airline 
operations, air cargo operations, pavement deicing, impact of capacity and 
delay issues, and speech communication are mitigated in importance because 
of the geographic location of the airport or its size. For instance, pavement 
deicing and air cargo operations carry less importance at general aviation 
airports, most likely because of a lack of financial resources for deicing and 
the lack of pavement or air cargo activities, respectively. Environmental 
compliance and knowledge of police procedures will receive varied response 
depending on the organizational structure, personnel staffing, expertise 
available, and location of the airport. An analysis of the standard deviations 
listed in Table 2 provides some explanation for the varied ranking. 
 Quilty 115 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study results included in this paper strive to address the knowledge 
and topic areas required by the airport industry for a curriculum in airport 
management. While providing support for the generalized knowledge 
requirements identified by the CAA, this study provides insight into the 
degree of importance for the knowledge areas sought by the industry. This 
information is of value to universities and accrediting bodies in improving 
airport management degree programs. The study reported in this paper can 
assist academicians, human resource directors, and airport managers in 
understanding basic knowledge requirements deemed important for 
individuals seeking employment in the field of airport operations and safety. 
From the ranking of knowledge requirements, course content can be 
refined to include and address the most important topics. Drawing on the 
assumption that the most common path to the position of airport manager or 
director begins with entry level airfield operation positions, current aviation 
management programs do not adequately address the needs of the airport 
industry. The position that most educational programs claim they prepare an 
individual for—that of airport manager or director—is not normally an entry 
level position. Based on the results from the survey, academicians and 
trainers can better prepare aspiring individuals for careers in airport 
operations and, subsequently, management. The research results also provide 
insight into the importance of skills and knowledge for different sized 
airports, as this data is lacking in previous studies. 
Based on the study results, it is suggested that the need exists for a 
specialized track or study area in airport management that contains the 
following dedicated courses: airport operations that cover in detail 14 CFR 
Part 139; emergency planning; airport security; general aviation operations; 
environment and noise; and airport design and construction. A 
recommendation is made to eliminate any course titled aviation management 
and reserve that term for describing an overall aviation program. Within the 
aviation management program would be specific tracks or study areas with 
more specialized courses addressing each area. The term “aviation 
management” is suggested to be defined as the collective offering of courses 
and material that will develop the skills and knowledge of an individual for 
the purpose of ensuring the safety of the aviation system and furthering its 
economic and social benefits. 
The CAA (1992) states in its criteria for aviation management:  
 
Care must be taken to avoid preparation in a field that is too narrow; however, without 
adequate depth of study in a specific area, the student is not likely to have the special 
expertise that will set him or her apart from others. (p. 27)  
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Answering the question of what is the proper balance of courses that 
will result in a reasonable number of credit hours, meet university 
accreditation and policy requirements, and satisfy the needs of the industry 
requires further dialogue and debate among academicians and the industry. 
This paper contributes to the dialogue by identifying topics to be included in 
an airport operations and management curriculum. Colleges and universities 
preparing individuals for entry level positions at airports should undertake a 
review and modification of their curriculum and courses to address important 
knowledge areas. 
Still in question is at what educational level should these courses be 
taught and to what degree of specialization? In his 2004 issue paper, Quilty 
proposed a performance outcome model that provides a simple analogy for 
what skill, ability and knowledge attainment should be addressed at different 
institutional levels. He suggested a graduate of a 2-year associate program 
would have skills and knowledge to obtain entry level positions but would 
require supervision and direction, while a graduate from a 4-year institution 
would be able to function more autonomously, and a graduate program 
would allow students to move directly into supervisory positions. 
Further dialogue and debate should be centered around the mission and 
role of an aviation program at the 2-year or 4-year undergraduate level, and 
around how to balance the needs of university accreditation requirements 
against the need for specialized training and education in aviation. Should 
the role be that of preparing an individual with the specific skills needed or a 
broad educational perspective? It is a specialized training versus general 
education debate that should be continued within the industry by 
practitioners, academicians, and the accrediting bodies of aviation programs.  
The results from this study would indicate a need exists within the airport 
industry for more specialization. 
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APPENDIX A 
Identification of subgroups and applicable survey ranking stems for 91 
knowledge variables important for individuals employed in the field of 
airfield operations or for those individuals having duties for inspection or 
safety of the airfield 
 
Subgroup 1 - Part 139 Regulation 
Knowledge of 14 CFR Part 139 requirements and airfield operations responsibilities. 
Knowledge of Airport Certification Manual Requirements and Contents. 
Knowledge of federal regulatory and enforcement process. 
Subgroup 2 - Self Inspection 
Knowledge of FAA Form 5010. 
Knowledge of airport self-inspection components and techniques. 
Knowledge of airport condition reporting and issuance of NOTAMs. 
Subgroup 3 - Lighting, Signs, Marking 
Knowledge of airfield lighting, signage and marking requirements and maintenance. 
Subgroup 4 - Wildlife 
Knowledge of wildlife hazard mitigation problems and techniques. 
Subgroup 5 - Vehicle Operation 
Ability to operate light and/or heavy vehicles and equipment . 
Knowledge of ground vehicle operation and radio procedures. 
Knowledge of bid specifications related to equipment and other purchases. 
Knowledge of air traffic control operations and procedures. 
Subgroup 6 - Snow and Ice 
Knowledge of Snow and Ice Control Plans and snow removal operations . 
Understanding of the application and use of deice and anti-ice compounds for pavements. 
Subgroup 7 - Part 77 Obstructions 
Knowledge of air traffic navigational equipment and operation. 
Knowledge of 14 CFR Part 77 Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace. 
Use of FAA Form 7460-1 Notice of Construction and/or Alteration. 
Subgroup 8 - ARFF and Emergency Plan 
Knowledge of Aircraft Rescue/Firefighting techniques and application. 
Understanding of the Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) and response capabilities. 
Subgroup 9 - Hazardous Material 
Knowledge of the DOT hazardous substances and materials markings and placards. 
Knowledge of material data safety sheet information. 
Knowledge of fueling operations and fuel storage tanks/trucks safety. 
Subgroup 10 - Aviation General 
Understanding of acronyms, terms and common phrases used in aviation and on the 
airfield. 
Understanding of airport history and development. 
Understanding of aviation law application to airports and aircraft operations. 
Knowledge of meteorology and flight planning. 
Subgroup 11 - Security 
Knowledge of airport security plan responsibilities under TSA Part 1542 (former Part 
107). 
Knowledge of air carrier security plan requirements under TSA Part 1544 (former Part 
108). 
Knowledge of air cargo security plan requirements under TSA Part 1546 (former Part 
109). 
Knowledge of SIDA, access control, and identification procedures. 
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Knowledge of new security technology and its application on airports. 
Knowledge of 14 CFR Part 191 security disclosure requirements. 
Understanding of police and law enforcement procedures. 
Subgroup 12 - Master Plan and Design 
Understanding of airport design and layout. 
Understanding of airport and transportation master planning processes. 
Understanding of airport capacity, delay and transportation impacts. 
Subgroup 13 - Aircraft Characteristics 
Knowledge of helicopter and V/STOL operations. 
Knowledge and understanding of general aviation operations and regulations. 
Knowledge and understanding of air taxi/charter operations and regulations. 
Knowledge and understanding of airline operations and regulations. 
Knowledge and understanding of air cargo/freight operations, regulations and logistics. 
Knowledge of requirements and procedures for airlines/aircraft deicing. 
Knowledge of military operations and activity on airports. 
Knowledge of aircraft operations and regulations. 
Subgroup 14 - Environment and Noise 
Understanding of noise, noise measurement and laws related to aviation noise. 
Understanding of environmental laws and regulations. 
Knowledge of Environmental Acts, compliance and audits affecting airports. 
Subgroup 15 - Ground Transportation 
Understanding of ground transportation (taxis, limos, buses, shuttles, etc.) operations. 
Understanding of parking garage/lot function and operations. 
Subgroup 16 - Building Systems 
Knowledge of building system operation (heating, air conditioning, utility, plumbing). 
Knowledge of facility maintenance methods and processes. 
Knowledge of American Disability Act (ADA) regulations and their applicability to 
airports. 
Knowledge of architectural principles and practices. 
Subgroup 17 - Communication 
Ability to speak, read and understand a second languages. 
Knowledge of speech and public communication principles and application. 
Knowledge of interpersonal, group and organizational communication. 
Understanding of a communications center function and operation. 
Subgroup 18 - Management and Supervision 
Understanding of general supervision and management principles. 
Knowledge of human resource and employee development processes. 
Understanding of labor relations. 
Understanding of social psychology principles and application. 
Subgroup 19 - Administration 
Understanding of political science and organization politics. 
Knowledge of airport/public administration principles and practices. 
Subgroup 20 - Economics 
Understanding of micro economics (local or national activity). 
Understanding of macro economics (global activity). 
Understanding of geographic and socioeconomic principles. 
Knowledge of civil engineering principles and practices. 
Subgroup 21 - Project Management and Construction 
Knowledge of airfield construction methods and processes. 
Understanding of project management practices. 
Knowledge of building construction codes, methods and processes. 
Knowledge of airport construction activity monitoring and practices. 
Subgroup 22 - Marketing 
Understanding of public relations and information dissemination. 
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Understanding of marketing practices and principles. 
Understanding of the travel and tourism industry. 
Knowledge of international commerce relations, business practices and handling 
processes. 
Subgroup 23 - Contracts and Law 
Understanding of contract and lease administration. 
Understanding of property and real estate management. 
Understanding of risk management and insurance administration. 
Understanding of contract law application to airports. 
Understanding of tort law application to airports. 
Knowledge of OSHA regulations and insurance requirements. 
Subgroup 24 - Finance and Accounting 
Knowledge of finance and capital funding methods and processes. 
Knowledge of accounting and budgeting methods and processes. 
Knowledge of applied business statistics. 
Subgroup 25 - Record Management 
Understanding of records management and management information system manipulation. 
Use of computer science skills associated with programming. 
Use of computer skills associated with word, draw and spreadsheet applications. 
Use of computer skills associated with Autocad and GIS application. 
Subgroup 26 - Science 
Understanding of basic electricity and electronic principles and application at airports. 
Knowledge of new technology development and application at airports. 
Knowledge of science principles and their application to airport operations. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. The variable “Knowledge of airport certification specifications requirements and 
content” was not included in the statistical final rankings due to revisions to 14 CFR Part 139 
during the study making it obsolete as a knowledge requirement. 
APPENDIX B 
Ranking of 92 knowledge variables important for individuals employed 
in the field of airfield operations or for those individuals having duties for 
inspection or safety of the airfield, by airport size using visual and numeric 
coding. 
        Airport size rank distribution      Visual rank distribution 
Overall 
Rank 
Visual 
Code 
Topic LH MH SH NH GA LH MH SH NH GA 
1 XXX Ground Vehicle 
Operation 
2 7 2 6 5 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
2 XXX Self Inspection 6 3 1 3 1 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
3 XXX Lighting 7 1 5 4 16 XXX XXX XXX XXX  
4 XXX Airport Emergency Plan 11 11 6 1 2 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
5 XXX NOTAMs 1 6 7 9 3 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
6 XXX 14 CFR Part 139 
compliance 
4 2 4 2 4 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
7 XXX Airport Certification 
Manual 
3 4 9 5 8 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
8 XXX Acronyms 9 8 11 7 10 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
9 XXX Security ID Area 5 9 3 8 6 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
10 XXX Construct Activity 13 5 12 13 7 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
11 XXX Airport Certification 
Specifications 
8 13 10 12 14 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
12 XXX Wildlife 10 12 13 10 15 XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
13 XXX Airport Security Plan 14 10 17 18 12 XXX XXX   XXX 
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Overall 
Rank 
Visual 
Code 
Topic LH MH SH NH GA LH MH SH NH GA 
14 XXX Part 77 Obstructions 17 15 14 19 19  XXX XXX   
15 XXX Airport Design and 
Layout 
23 24 22 17 20      
16  GA Operations 20 14 8 11 11  XXX XXX XXX XXX 
17  Air Traffic Control 
Operations 
21 18 15 14 17   XXX XXX  
18  Airport 
Rescue/Firefighting 
12 25 18 22 9 XXX    XXX 
19  Fueling Operations 18 22 19 15 28    XXX  
20  Aircraft Regulations 29 23 25 21 13     XXX 
21  Federal Regulations 25 16 21 16 26      
22  Communication Center 
Operations. 
22 17 24 20 27      
23  Form 5010 15 28 16 25 21 XXX     
24  Snow Removal 
Operations. 
27 44 31 24 35  *** ***  *** 
25  Airline Operations 30 31 40 23 23  *** ***   
26  Management 33 20 26 27 36 ***    *** 
27  Form 7460-1 
Obstructions 
28 29 29 42 41    *** *** 
28  Construction Methods 26 26 20 26 39     *** 
29  Air Carrier Security Plan 31 34 27 30 38 *** ***   *** 
30  Air Traffic Control 
Equipment 
32 33 23 46 18 *** ***  √√√  
31 *** Word and Spreadsheet 
Applications 
24 43 43 45 24  *** *** ***  
32 *** New Security 
Technology 
16 19 33 35 42   *** *** *** 
33 *** Air Cargo Security Plan 48 21 28 37 50 √√√   *** √√√ 
34 *** Public Relations 19 30 44 36 30   *** ***  
35 *** Material Safety Data 
Sheets 
53 27 46 39 32 √√√  √√√ *** *** 
36 *** Organizational 
Communication 
36 47 34 29 37 *** √√√ ***  *** 
37 *** Air Taxi  Ops. 49 48 37 40 34 √√√ √√√ *** *** *** 
38 *** Environment 
Compliance 
44 32 30 38 59 *** ***  *** √√√ 
39 *** Department of 
Transportation Hazmat
42 37 41 28 45 *** *** ***  *** 
40 *** Part 191 Sensitive 
Security Information 
47 40 38 34 46 √√√ *** *** *** √√√ 
41 *** Environmental 
Regulations 
38 35 32 41 31 *** *** *** *** *** 
42 *** Public Administration 39 36 65 32 49 *** *** ----- *** √√√ 
43 *** Pavement Deicing 41 38 51 49 29 *** *** √√√ √√√  
44 *** Air Cargo Operations 37 39 54 47 25 *** *** √√√ √√√  
45 *** Occupational Safety 
Health regulations 
40 50 53 43 47 *** √√√ √√√ *** √√√ 
46 √√√ Police Procedures 34 66 45 52 33 *** ----- *** √√√ *** 
47 √√√ Noise Requirements 35 41 48 31 40 *** *** √√√ *** *** 
48 √√√ Capacity/delay Impact 45 52 55 62 57 *** √√√ √√√ ----- √√√ 
49 √√√ Speech Communications 43 58 36 50 22 *** √√√ *** √√√  
50 √√√ Project Management 54 45 47 44 62 √√√ *** √√√ *** ----- 
51 √√√ Human Resource 
Department Processes 
58 63 39 33 43 √√√ ----- *** *** *** 
52 √√√ ADA Requirements. 57 46 35 60 51 √√√ √√√ *** √√√ √√√ 
53 √√√ Meteorology 46 51 56 55 74 √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ ----- 
54 √√√ Military Operations 68 42 42 56 61 ----- *** *** √√√ ---- 
55 √√√ Bid Specifications 52 55 66 51 48 √√√ √√√ ----- √√√ √√√ 
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Overall 
Rank 
Visual 
Code 
Topic LH MH SH NH GA LH MH SH NH GA 
56 √√√ Ground Transport 56 54 52 63 58 √√√ √√√ √√√ ---- √√√ 
57 √√√ Airport History 61 53 67 48 70 ----- √√√ ----- √√√ ----- 
58 √√√ New Airport Technology 51 49 57 59 44 √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ *** 
59 √√√ Equipment Operations 50 64 61 54 55 √√√ ----- ----- √√√ √√√ 
60 √√√ Contract/Lease 
Administration 
71 62 50 61 64 ----- ----- √√√ ----- ----- 
61 ----- Aviation Law 66 56 59 53 60 ----- √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ 
62 ----- Facility Maintenance 63 60 60 65 69 ----- √√√ √√√ ----- ----- 
63 ----- Management 
Information Systems 
55 68 49 64 72 √√√ ----- √√√ ----- ----- 
64 ----- Master Plan Process 64 65 58 57 52 ----- ----- √√√ √√√ √√√ 
65 ----- Parking Operations 60 72 68 71 53 √√√ ----- ----- ----- √√√ 
66 ----- Aircraft Deicing 67 59 69 69 56 ----- √√√ ----- ----- √√√ 
67 ----- Labor Relations 72 70 64 58 54 ----- ----- ----- √√√ √√√ 
68 ----- Science Principles 65 71 63 74 67 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
69 ----- Risk Management 70 57 75 67 75 ----- √√√ ----- ----- ----- 
70 ----- Accounting 84 67 62 79 76 $$$ ----- ----- $$$ $$$ 
71 ----- Travel and Tourism 69 83 73 73 81 ----- $$$ ----- ----- $$$ 
72 ----- Finance 83 69 71 70 78 $$$ ----- ----- ----- $$$ 
73 ------ Property Management 77 78 79 72 79 $$$ $$$ $$$ ----- $$$ 
74 ----- Electricity Basics 62 87 70 75 68 ----- $$$ ----- ----- ----- 
75 ----- Contract Law 59 76 82 76 73 √√√ $$$ $$$ $$$ ----- 
76 $$$ Building Codes 92 74 78 80 63 $$$ ----- $$$ $$$ ----- 
77 $$$ Marketing 81 61 84 77 66 $$$ ----- $$$ $$$ ------ 
78 $$$ Helicopter Operations 73 79 74 66 77 ----- $$$ ----- ----- $$$ 
79 $$$ Building Systems 82 82 72 78 80 $$$ $$$ ----- $$$ $$$ 
80 $$$ Tort Law 86 89 83 68 65 $$$ $$$ $$$ ----- ----- 
81 $$$ Politics 89 77 85 82 86 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
82 $$$ Civil Engineering 75 88 80 85 71 ----- $$$ $$$ $$$ ----- 
83 $$$ Computer Aided 
Design/GIS 
90 73 77 83 82 $$$ ----- $$$ $$$ $$$ 
84 $$$ Programming 91 85 76 81 87 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
85 $$$ Architecture 80 75 89 90 85 $$$ ----- $$$ $$$ $$$ 
86 $$$ Social Psychology 76 84 81 84 83 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
87 $$$ Statistics 87 91 87 88 88 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
88 $$$ Micro Economics 88 90 86 86 90 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
89 $$$ Foreign Language 78 81 92 91 91 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
90 $$$ Socioeconomics 85 80 88 89 84 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
91 $$$ Macro Economics 74 86 91 92 92 ----- $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
92 $$$ International Commerce 79 92 90 87 89 $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ $$$ 
 
Note. All airports N = 116; LH = Large-Hub (n = 22), Medium-Hub = MH (n = 19); Small-
Hub = SH (n = 16): Non-Hub = NH (n = 31); General Aviation/Reliever = GA (n = 28). 
